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Under current New York law, taxpayers who contest their assess-
ments must rely upon a system of review conducted by the New York
State Department of Taxation and Finance. Taxpayers, lawyers, and
accountants have strongly attacked this system.1 Critical comment
has also come from other, disinterested quarters. A 1975 report by
the Governor's Task Force on Court Reform, for example, concluded
that "the power to adjudicate tax disputes now given the State Tax
Commission should be withdrawn from it."' The 1979 Governor's
Temporary Commission to Review the Sales and Use Tax Laws rec-
ommended the consideration of an independent tax appeals board.'
Most recently, a 1984 report by the Office of the State Comptroller
identified major deficiencies in the processing and resolution of tax
controversies.4 Criticisms of the tax appeals system have focused on a
number of claimed defects, including the inefficiency of the appeals
process, the quality of the decisions rendered and, most importantly,
the unfairness of the procedural structure used to hear and resolve
disputes. This Article evaluates these complaints and explores alter-
natives to the present system.
Section I of this Article describes the existing New York tax ap-
The Tax Section of the New York State Bar Association has been the most vocal critic of
the New York State tax appeals system; this criticism dates back several years. See, e.g., NEW
YORK STATE BAR Assoc., TAX SECTION, SPECIAL REPORT ON A NEW YORK TAX COURT PROPOSAL
(1975); Creating a New York State Tax Court, Statement of Martin D. Ginsburg, Chairman of
the Tax Section, New York State Bar Association, Before the Select Task Force on Court Reor-
ganization on N.Y.S. Bill 6760 and N.Y.A. Bill 7802 (Nov. 20, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Gins-
burg Statement]; see also Comeau & Rosen, The Need for an Independent Tax Tribunal, 2 J.
ST. TAX'N 259 (1983).
2 Governor's Task Force on Judicial Selection & Court Reform, The Integration and Unifica-
tion of the New York State Trial Courts 2 (June 26, 1975) [hereinafter cited as Governor's Task
Force Report]. The Task Force was chaired by Cyrus Vance and had among its distinguished
members then New York Secretary of State, Mario Cuomo. The report recommends consolidat-
ing the entire New York State trial court system to increase procedural efficiency and to im-
prove the administration of justice. To this end it suggests, inter alia, removing the power to
adjudicate tax disputes from the State Tax Commission and placing it in a specialized tax
section of the Supreme Court. Id. at 2. In addressing the merger of the tax appeals system, the
task force specifically noted the lack of independence of the current appeals system, and the
resulting perceptions of unfairness by taxpayers. Id. at 9-10.
' Governor's Temporary Commission to Review the Sales and Use Tax Laws of New York
State, Final Report 77 (Dec. 15, 1979). In 1975, changes were made in the procedures for adju-
dicating tax disputes, see infra note 145, but as discussed in section II(A) of this Article, tax-
payers still perceive the resulting system as unfair. See infra notes 98-143 and accompanying
text.
4 OFFICE OF THE STATE COMPTROLLER, DEP'T OF TAXATION & FIN., TAX APPEALS BUREAU, RE-
PORT 84-S-104 (1984) [hereinafter cited as REPORT 84-S-104]. The State Tax Commission dis-
agrees in part with the findings of the Comptroller. See id. at A-3 to A-14.
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peals system in detail. It then surveys the tax appeals procedures of
other jurisdictions, focusing on the procedures of selected states and
of the federal government. A review and evaluation of the complaints
leveled against the New York system are presented in section II. Sec-
tion III concludes the Article by setting forth a range of policy op-
tions that are alternatives to the current scheme.
I. TAX ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS
The federal government and each of the fifty states have estab-
lished different approaches for the adjudication of tax disputes.
These approaches fall into three broad categories. The first category
consists of tax courts, which are established either as separate courts
or as divisions of the lower courts of general jurisdiction.5 A second
category consists of independent review agencies.' These may occa-
sionally be referred to as courts, as in the case of the United States
Tax Court. They are, however, actually a part of the legislative or
executive rather than the judicial branch of government.7 These inde-
pendent agencies exist wholly outside of the tax departments. A third
category of tax appeals systems, which includes that of New York,
consists of internal review mechanisms. In such systems, a taxpayer's
dispute is heard by the same agency responsible for the administra-
tion and collection of taxes.'
See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1201 (1981) (division of lower court); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 232-6
(1976) (separate); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-1 (West Supp. 1984-1985) (separate); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 305.405(1) (1981) (separate).
6 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-141 (1980); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 18581 (Deering 1975);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 329 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-18 (1980 & Supp. 1984); IDAHO CODE
§ 63-3811 (1976 & Supp. 1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 421.1 (West 1971 & Supp. 1984-1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 74-2437 (1980); Ky. REV. STAT. § 131.340 (Supp. 1984); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
47:1401 (West .1970); MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 224 (Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 58A, § 1
(Michie/Law. Co-op. 1978 & Supp. 1984); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 7.251 (Callaghan 1984); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 271.01 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE ANN. § 27-3-1 (Supp. 1983); Mo.
ANN. STAT. §§ 138.190, .380 (Vernon Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-2-201 (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 77-501 (1981); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 71-B:2 (Supp. 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 105-269.2
(1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5717.01, .02 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tits. 71-
72, §§ 115, 503 (Purdon 1962 & Supp. 1984-1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 82.03.010 -
83.03.190 (1981 & Supp. 1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 73.01 (West 1957 & Supp. 1984-1985).
For example, the United States Tax Court is a legislative court under Article I, rather than
a judicial court under Article III, of the United States Constitution. See I.R.C. § 7441 (1982);
see also Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929); American Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828); Continental Equities, Inc. v. Commissioner, 551 F.2d 74 (5th Cir.
1977); Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392 (1971).
8 See ALA. CODE § 40-18-40 (1977); ALASKA STAT. § 43.05.240 (1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 84-
4719 (1980); COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-21-103 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-510 (West 1983);
19851
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Apart from their distinct structural frameworks, tax appeals sys-
tems differ in numerous ways that can affect the fairness or the effi-
ciency of the adjudicatory appeal process. The formalities of the pro-
ceedings, the qualifications of those who hear cases, and the
mechanisms for prehearing settlement all vary among such systems.
The following sections of this Article describe the structures and pro-
cedures of the various approaches. This examination reveals how the
policy concerns that must be addressed in New York have been re-
solved elsewhere.
A. Internal Review Mechanisms: New York's Current Approach
New York's current system for adjudicating tax disputes provides
an example of an internal review system. In New York, the State Tax
Commission oversees the Taxation Division of the Department of
Taxation and Finance.9 The President of the three-member Commis-
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 214.11 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 120, § 9-901 (Smith-Hurd 1970);
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-8.1-3-1 (Burns 1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 151 (Supp. 1984-1985);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 360.010 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-1-24 (1983); NEW YORK TAX LAW §§ 170-
171 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1984-1985) N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-01-11 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 68, § 221 (West 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-89 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2300 (Law.
Co-op. 1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 10-1-41 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-1-105
(1983); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 111.001-.003 (Vernon 1982); UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-5-37 (Supp.
1983); W. VA. CODE § 11-10-9 (1983); Wyo. STAT. § 39-1-302 (1977).
9 N.Y. TAX LAW § 170(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). Among the various powers and duties
of the Commission set forth in § 171 of the Tax Law are the following:
First. Make such reasonable rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, as may
be necessary for the exercise of its powers and the performance of its duties under this
chapter.
Second. Assess, determine, revise, readjust and impose the corporation taxes ... have
the power and perform the duties of the state comptroller in the collection of such taxes
and the crediting of such taxes erroneously paid, as jurisdiction thereof is vested in such
commission by section one hundred and seventy-six of this chapter.
Third.. . . have the powers and perform the duties of the state comptroller in relation
to the assessment, determination and collection of the tax on transfers of property . ...
Fifth. have the power and perform the duties of the state comptroller in the as-
sessment, determination, review, readjustment and collection of taxes upon and with re-
spect to personal income . ...
Fifteenth. Have authority to compromise any taxes or any warrant or judgment for
taxes imposed by this chapter, and the penalties and interest in connection therewith, if
the tax debtor has been discharged in bankruptcy, or is shown by proofs submitted to be
insolvent, but the amount payable in compromise shall in no event be less than the
amount, if any, recoverable through legal proceedings, and provided that where the
amount owing for taxes, penalties and interest or the warrant or judgment is more than
twenty-five thousand dollars, such compromise shall be effective only when approved by
a justice of the supreme court.
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sion is also the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance and thus the
Seventeenth. Have authority to release any real property or chattels real from the lien
of any warrant for unpaid taxes upon such conditions as it may exact, if it finds that the
interests of the state will not thereby be jeopardized. Such release may be recorded in
the office of any recording officer in which such warrant has been filed.
Eighteenth. Have authority to enter into a written agreement with any person, relating
to the liability of such person (or of the person for whom he acts) in respect of any tax or
fee imposed by the tax law or by a law enacted pursuant to the authority of the tax law
• . . which agreement shall be final and conclusive, and except upon a showing of fraud,
malfeasance, or misrepresentation of a material fact: (a) the case shall not be reopened
as to the matters agreed upon or the agreement modified, by any officer, employee, or
agent of this state, and (b) in any suit, action, or proceeding, such agreement, or any
determination, assessment, collection, payment, cancellation, abatement, refund or credit
made in accordance therewith, shall not be annulled, modified, set aside or disregarded.
Twentieth. Have authority, of its own motion, to abate any small unpaid balance of an
assessment of tax, or any liability in respect thereof . . . if the tax commission deter-
mines under uniform rules prescribed by its [sic] that the administration and collection
costs involved would not warrant collection of the amount due. It may also abate, of its
own motion, the unpaid portion of the assessment of any of such taxes, or any liability in
respect thereof, which is excessive in amount, or is assessed after the expiration of the
period of limitation properly applicable thereto, or is erroneously or illegally assessed.
No claim for abatement under this subdivision shall be filed for any of such taxes.
Twenty-first. Provide a hearing, as a matter of right, to any taxpayer upon such tax-
payer's request, pursuant to such rules, regulations, forms and instructions as the tax
commission may prescribe, unless a right to a hearing is specifically provided for, modi-
fied in [sic] denied by another provision of this chapter. Where the request for a hearing
is made by a person seeking review of any taxes determined or claimed to be due under
this chapter, the liability of such person shall become finally and irrevocably fixed unless
such person, within ninety days from the time such liability is assessed, shall petition the
tax commission for a hearing to review such liability. After such hearing, the tax commis-
sion shall give notice of its decision to such person. The decision of the tax commission
shall be reviewable by a proceeding under article seventy-eight of the civil practice law
and rules if application therefor is made within four months after the giving of such
decision.
Twenty-second. Be required to render a determination after a hearing, within nine
months after submission of briefs subsequent to completion of such a hearing or, if such
briefs are not submitted, then within nine months after completion of such a hearing.
Such nine month period may be extended by the tax commission, for good cause shown,
to no more than three additional months. If the tax commission fails to render a decision
or determination within such nine month period (or such period as extended pursuant to
this subdivision), the applicant for such hearing may institute a proceeding under article
seventy-eight of the civil practice law and rules to compel the issuance of such decision
or determination.
Twenty-third. Be required to publish and make available to the public all decisions
and determinations of the tax commission rendered after a hearing. The tax commission
may charge a reasonable fee for a copy of such a decision or determination.
Twenty-fourth. Be required to render advisory opinions with respect to taxes adminis-
tered by the tax commission within ninety days of the receipt of a petition for such an
opinion. Such ninety day period may be extended by the tax commission, for good cause
shown, to no more than thirty additional days. Such advisory opinion shall be rendered
to any person subject to a tax or liability under this chapter or claiming exemption from
Albany Law Review [Vol. 49
chief executive officer of the Department. He is appointed by the
Governor for a term coinciding with that of the Governor.1  The re-
maining two members of the Commission serve for fixed terms of six
years." Although the Commission is granted broad powers to admin-
ister the state's tax laws," most of these powers are, in fact, executed
by the Department. The Commission's primary task is to rule on con-
tested tax matters; it has promulgated Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure to govern proceedings before it.'" The Commission also reviews
and promulgates regulations that are proposed by the Department of
Taxation and Finance."
The Tax Appeals Bureau is the administrative adjudicatory arm of
such tax or liability. Such advisory opinions, which shall be published and made availa-
ble to the public, shall not be binding upon the tax commission except with respect to
the person to whom such opinion is rendered provided, however, that a subsequent tax
commission modification of such an advisory opinion shall operate prospectively only. A
petition for an advisory opinion shall contain a specific set of facts and be submitted in
such form as may be prescribed by the tax commission and subject to such rules and
regulations as the tax commission may promulgate with respect to the procedures for
submission of such a petition. Nothing herein shall be construed to limit or otherwise
alter the rights of any applicant or a declaratory ruling pursuant to section two hundred
four of the state administrative procedure act.
Id. (footnote omitted).
'0 See id. § 170(1) (McKinney 1966). Section 170(1) reads in relevant part:
The commissioner of taxation and finance shall be appointed by the governor by and
with the advice and consent of the senate and shall hold office as commissioner of taxa-
tion and finance until the end of the term of the governor by whom he was appointed
and until his successor has been appointed and has qualified.
Id.
I d. § 170(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
" For a description of the Commission's powers, see id. § 171 which is quoted in part supra
note 9. The issuance of advisory opinions illustrates the dichotomy between what the statute
requires and what occurs in practice. Statutorily, the Commission is charged with the rendering
of advisory opinions. Id. In practice, however, the Commission is rarely involved in the render-
ing of such opinions, notwithstanding that all advisory opinions carry the name of the Tax
Commission. The State Tax Commission has expressly delegated the authority to issue advisory
opinions to the Director or Deputy Director of the Technical Services Bureau. N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 20, § 901.1(a) (1983).
"3 See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.0 (1981); id. §§ 601.1-.4 (1982); id. §§ 601.5-.7 (1976);
id. §§ 610.8-.9 (1981); id. §§ 601.10-.16 (1976).
" Letter from Paul B. Coburn, Secretary of the State Tax Commission, to Robert D. Platt-
ner, Counsel to the Tax Study Commission (Feb. 14, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Coburn Letter).
As chief executive officer of the Department, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance is
responsible for every aspect of the Department's activities, including the promulgation of regu-
lations which he then reviews in his capacity as one of the three members of the Commission.
Usually, however, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance is not personally involved in the
early stages of the regulatory process. Initial drafts of the regulations are prepared by the Tech-
nical Services Bureau of the Department and are then reviewed by the Law Bureau and placed
in final form. The Commissioner of Taxation and Finance may see a proposed regulation for
the first time only shortly before it is to be considered for approval at a meeting of the Tax
Commission.
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the State Tax Commission.' 5 The Bureau processes and reviews peti-
tions for the redetermination of a tax deficiency or refund. A tax-
payer generally has ninety days after a notice of deficiency l6 is mailed
in which to file a petition for redetermination.17 In most cases, once a
petition is filed, the review begins with an informal prehearing con-
ference which is conducted by a Bureau conferee.' 8 Conferences are
available at every district office of the Department and are scheduled
at the taxpayer's convenience. Conferees are typically auditors and
accountants with ten to fifteen years of experience with the Depart-
ment. Their role in the conference proceeding is that of an arbiter.
The Department is represented at the conference by a member of the
audit staff. In situations in which taxpayers appear without profes-
sional representation, the conferee ensures that they have the oppor-
tunity to present their cases.' 9
A dispute may be resolved in conference if the taxpayer and the
Department can arrive at an agreement.2 0 The conferee may propose
" See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.1(h) (1981).
16 A notice of deficiency is a demand for payment by the Tax Commission for the "amount of
the tax imposed by law, less the amount shown as the tax upon the taxpayer's return . . . and
the amounts previously assessed or collected as a deficiency, and plus the amount of any re-
bates to the taxpayer." 58A N.Y. JUR. Taxation § 856 (rev. ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). While
90 days is the usual time period to file for a redetermination, there are exceptions. For instance,
the stock transfer tax, N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 270 to 281-a (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1984-1985), and
the highway use tax, id. §§ 501-15, each provides for a 30-day period. In the case of some taxes,
such as the sales tax, a notice of determination and demand is issued rather than a notice of
deficiency. Id. § 1138 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1984-1985).
17 58A N.Y. JUR. Taxation § 903 (rev. ed. 1977). A petition for redetermination is a request
by the taxpayer for the Tax Commission to reassess the tax deficiency imposed by the notice of
deficiency. A taxpayer may obtain review of a refund application if a timely refund claim was
previously filed, provided the taxpayer did not previously file a petition for redetermination of
a deficiency for the same taxable year, and provided further that either six months have not
expired since the claim was filed or the Tax Commission has not disallowed the claim in whole
or part. N.Y. TAX LAW § 1089(c) (McKinney 1975). The petition for review of a refund applica-
tion must be filed within two years after the notice of disallowance was mailed, unless, during
that period, the taxpayer obtains a written extension from the Commission. Id. A request for a
refund may be made in a petition for redetermination of a deficiency for the same taxable
year(s). Id. § 1089(b).
"S If a case raises only questions of law and no questions of fact, the case may be assigned for
a hearing without a conference. Interview with John Sollecito, Director of the Tax Appeals
Bureau (Dec. 7, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Sollecito 1983 Interview]; see also, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 20, § 601.4 (1982).
11 Interview with John Sollecito, Director of the Tax Appeals Bureau (Aug. 5, 1982) [herein-
after cited as Sollecito 1982 Interview]. Mr. Sollecito described the conferee's role in these cir-
cumstances as "acting as the taxpayer's counsel, but not his advocate." Id.
so One impediment to the conference settlement mechanism is that neither the Department
nor the conferee may consider the hazards of litigation when considering a settlement. See
infra notes 152-63 and accompanying text. This policy is based upon the Commission's inter-
pretation of the statutory law under which it operates. Section 171 of the New York Tax Law
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a settlement which, if accepted by the taxpayer, is binding on the
Department. 1 The conferee acts with the delegated authority of the
Commission in resolving cases. 2 The Commission may revoke the
conferee's authority as it sees fit, although it seldom does so.
23
A taxpayer who is dissatisfied with the outcome of the conference
may perfect a petition for a hearing.24 Small claims hearings are
available for matters involving up to $10,000 in sales and compensa-
tion use tax per calendar year or up to $3,000 in personal income or
unincorporated business tax per taxable year, exclusive of penalties
and interest.25 Formal hearings are available for New York State and
local sales and income taxes in excess of the small claims limits and
for all other cases concerning state and local taxes under the purview
of the State Tax Commission.2
grants the Commission the authority to compromise taxes under certain narrowly defined cir-
cumstances. N.Y. TAx LAW § 171 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1983-1984). See also supra note 9.
By inference, these sections would seem to deny the power to do so in any other cases. Section
171, however, also grants the Commission broad powers to enter into agreements with taxpay-
ers relating to their liability. This section has not been interpreted by the Commission as a
grant of settlement authority. Rather, this section is viewed as protecting taxpayers from hav-
ing an agreement or determination of the Commission reopened in the future, except under
very limited conditions. Interview with Saul Heckelman, Special Counsel to the Department of
Taxation and Finance (Dec. 8, 1983). The ramifications of this policy are discussed in Part
II(B)(2) of the text. See infra text accompanying notes 152-63.
23 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.4(c)(3) (1976). Some members of the State Bar have
claimed that in practice the conferee usually defers to the auditor. See Comeau & Rosen, supra
note 1, at 260. The Department contends, on the contrary, that auditors often do not propose
resolutions on their own initiative but concur with those proposed by a conferee. See Coburn
Letter, supra note 14.
22 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.4 (1976).
"2 Sollecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
24 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.5(a) (1976). In order to be perfected, a petition must satisfy
the requirements set forth in the New York Administrative Code, see id. § 601.5(b), which
include a clear and concise statement of the facts, allegations, and relief sought. Id. §
601.5(b)(5), (6). Once the petition has been perfected, it is served on the Secretary to the State
Tax Commission and forwarded to the law bureau for an answer. Id. § 601.4(c)(4). Hearings are
held in New York City and at various upstate locations. Sollecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
The travel schedule for the circuit-riding hearing officers is set 12 months in advance; a tax-
payer's actual hearing date is set 60 to 90 days in advance. Id. A transcript of the record is
made in formal hearings. In small claims hearings, the proceedings are recorded on tape but
usually are not transcribed. See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.8(g)(3) (1983). The taxpayer
may, however, request the Commission to provide a copy of the record. Id. § 601.12(a). In such
case, the Commission may charge the taxpayer for the transcript at a price not to exceed rates
fixed by the Comptroller or reasonably fixed by the Commission. Id. § 601.12(b). A fee of one
dollar per page is currently charged. Coburn Letter, supra note 14.
25 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.8(b) (1981).
26 Coburn Letter, supra note 14. "Other cases" include corporate franchise tax; stock transfer
tax; mortgage recording tax; truck mileage tax; cigarette tax; motor fuel tax; gift tax; and li-
cense revocation for cigarette vendors. Id. The formal hearings unit also manages pre-decision
warrants. Id.; Letter from John Sollecito, Director, Tax Appeals Bureau, to the Legislative
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The hearing is conducted by a hearing officer, a Tax Appeals Bu-
reau employee whose qualifications are established by the Commis-
sion.17 The Commission conducts a four-year formal hearing officer
trainee program for recent law school graduates. 2 The hearing officer
has the authority to administer oaths, regulate the course of the
hearing, set the time and place for continuances and for filing legal
documents, and issue subpoenas.2" These subpoenas, which require
the production of witnesses or documents,30 are available upon a tax-
payer's request. Parties are encouraged to stipulate to relevant, un-
privileged facts to the extent possible.3 1 During a hearing, parties
may examine, cross-examine, and impeach witnesses, introduce ex-
hibits, and rebut evidence. 2 Section 306 of the New York State Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act contains a provision that requires that all
evidence, including records and documents in the possession of the
agency, be offered and made a part of the record. 3 The hearing of-
ficer may clarify an ambiguous record by asking questions of the par-
ties or witnesses. The burden of proof generally rests upon the tax-
payer.34 The Commission bears the burden, however, of determining
whether the taxpayer is (1) guilty of fraud with intent to evade taxa-
tion, (2) liable as the transferee of another taxpayer's property, or (3)
liable for any increase in a deficiency, provided the increase is as-
serted for the first time after a petition for redetermination of defi-
ciency is filed.3
After the formal proceedings, the hearing officer reviews the evi-
dence and makes written proposals for conclusions of law and find-
Drafting Research Fund of the Columbia University School of Law (Sept. 21, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Sollecito Sept. 1982 Letter].
'1 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.9(c) (1976); id. § 601.1(m) (1982).
28 Small claims hearing officers need not be attorneys. Their qualifications, however, include
strong experience in accounting and auditing and a background in the technical and legal as-
pects of a particular tax.
The training program for formal hearing officers is overseen by the New York State Depart-
ment of Civil Service. Hearing officers are appointed to the program from a Civil Service list
generated by an open, competitive examination. All appointees are attorneys, but each has
varying degrees of legal experience. More experienced lawyers face a somewhat shorter training
program. Coburn Letter, supra note 14.
2' N.Y. ADMIN. CODE. tit. 20, § 601.9(c) (1976).
30 Id. § 601.11(c).
11 Id. § 601.7(a).
32 Id. § 601.9(d)(1).
3 N.Y.A.P.A. § 306(2) (McKinney 1984).
34 N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 689(e), 1089(e) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1984-1985).
35 Id. Although the statement in the text correctly reflects the statutory law under which the
burden of proof is placed on the Commission in these instances, in fact, the Department bears
the burden of proof in all situations. Coburn Letter, supra note 14.
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ings of fact for the Commission." These recommendations are re-
viewed by a post-hearing review unit3 7 which reports its findings to
the Director of the Tax Appeals Bureau. The Director can write a
dissent if he disagrees with a hearing officer's recommendation, but
he may not alter the opinion.38 The hearing officer can write a justifi-
cation in response to the Director's dissent. The opinion and any dis-
sent or justification are forwarded to the Commission for its final de-
cision. In the case of a formal hearing, the entire record, including a
stenographic transcript of the proceedings, is also sent to the
Commission. 9
In small claims cases, the Commission must render its final deci-
sion within ninety days of the submission of either the written argu-
ments or the completion of the hearing.4 ° For formal hearings, the
decision is due within nine months after the submission of briefs or,
if briefs are not filed, nine months after completion of the hearing.41
The nine-month period may be extended to twelve months for good
cause.2 If the Commission fails to render a timely decision, the tax-
payer may institute a mandamus proceeding under Article 78 of the
New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR)."3
The full Commission reviews all recommendations for writing style
and soundness of legal reasoning, as well as for the reasonableness
and application of any regulations at issue in the case." The Com-
mission is assisted by an initial review performed by the Secretary to
the Commission, who is appointed by vote of the Commission."5 A
Commission member who has a question concerning the facts of the
case may examine the record or contact the Tax Appeals Bureau.46 In
rare cases in which a specific procedural point is unclear, the Com-
16 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.9(e) (1976).
" The post-hearing review unit consists of five technicians and two supervisors, one in
charge of sales and one in charge of income tax. They review decisions for technical accuracy,
conformity with precedent, and general form. Sollecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
18 Sollecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
19 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.9(e) (1976).
40 Id. § 601.8(h).
4' N.Y. TAx LAW § 171(22) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
42 Id.
43 Id. (incorporating by reference NEW YORK CIv. PRAc. LAW §§ 7801-7806 (McKinney 1981 &
Supp. 1984-1985)).
" In about 15% of the cases, the Commission sends the decision back to the hearing officer
for a rewrite in accordance with the Commission's directions. Interview with Mark Friedlander,
Commissioner, and Thomas Lynch, former Commissioner, New York State Tax Commission
(Aug. 24, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Friedlander & Lynch Interview].
" Sollecito 1982 Interview, supra note 19.
" The Commissioners usually open the record only if there is a disputed fact, novel issue
involved, or large sum of money at stake. See Friedlander & Lynch Interview, supra note 44.
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mission may contact the Department of Taxation and Finance.4"
Commission decisions are provided immediately to both the tax-
payer and the Department.48 Subsequently, the Department's Divi-
sion of Taxpayer Services publishes and disseminates Commission
decisions with an annotation stating whether the decision conforms
with Departmental policy. 49 An annotation indicating nonconformity
with audit policy requires the express approval of the Commission in
compliance with a procedure outlined in a Departmental Executive
Memorandum." Such annotations are relatively rare. All other Com-
mission decisions become official Departmental policy. Commission
decisions are available to all persons on the Commission mailing list
and are reproduced as headnotes, excerpts, and occasionally in full by
two privately published tax law services."1
Only the taxpayer can appeal an adverse decision of the Commis-
sion 52 by bringing an Article 78 proceeding, the standard procedure
in New York for contesting the determination of a state agency. 5
This proceeding is initiated in the Supreme Court of Albany County,
from which it may be transferred to the Appellate Division, Third
Department in Albany.5 4 Article 78 authorizes reversal of an agency
decision if "affected by an error of law.""5 The standard of review
used for questions of fact is much less clear. The statute states that
reversal of an agency decision will turn on "whether a determination
was .. .arbitrary and capricious," 56 but also provides for reversal
unless "a determination made as a result of a hearing . . . is, on the
entire record, supported by substantial evidence." '57 In practice, judi-
cial decisions reviewing determinations of the Commission have not
, Commissioner Mark Friedlander estimates that this occurs in approximately one case out
of one hundred, although there are no procedural barriers to more extensive contact. His own
experience involved inquiring on one occasion Whether audit division procedures would permit
an entirely fresh audit of the matter at issue. Id.
48 N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.8(h) (1981); id. § 601.9(e) (1976).
4' Commissioner of Taxation and Finance, Implementing Determinations of the State Tax
Commission on Small Claims and Formal Hearings, file no. E-130 (Oct. 10, 1978).
80 Id.
6' Commerce Clearing House and Prentice Hall provide this service. The complete texts of
decisions of the Commission dating back to 1979 are also available through LEXIS, a comput-
erized legal research service.
:2 N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 690(b), 1090(b) (McKinney 1975).
3S N.Y. CIv. PRAc. LAW § 7801 commentary at C7801:4 (McKinney 1981). See also supra note
43 and accompanying text.
84 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 506(b) (McKinney 1976); id. § 7804(8) (McKinney 1981 & Supp.
1984-1985).
88 Id. § 7803(3) (1981).
"Id.
57 Id. § 7803(4).
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strictly applied these statutory standards. Instead, they have adopted
a deferential but ill-defined standard of review.
58
B. Tax Courts
Three states - Oregon, Hawaii, and New Jersey - and the Dis-
trict of Columbia have judicial tax courts.59 New Jersey, the most re-
cent state to establish a tax court,60 is representative of the tax court
system and therefore may serve as a case study. The New Jersey Tax
Court is a full-fledged judicial court, hearing both state tax and local
property tax cases. The court replaced the New Jersey State Division
of Tax Appeals, a quasi-judicial body within the State Division of the
Treasury. The court is an inferior court of limited jurisdiction.6 Its
six to twelve judges are appointed by the Governor and confirmed by
the Senate for an initial seven-year term with lifetime tenure upon
reappointment.6" At present, eight judges have been appointed. Re-
quirements for appointment include special expertise in tax law and
admission to the New Jersey Bar for at least ten years. There must
be an equal number of Democrat and Republican judges.
6 3
The tax court is a court of record having the power to determine
all matters in controversy. 6" Individual judges hear and decide all is-
sues of fact and law de novo.65 Judges also conduct pre-trial and set-
tlement conferences and a large majority of cases are resolved prior
to trial.66 The court is empowered to grant legal and equitable relief
18 See, e.g., Grace v. New York State Tax Comm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 193, 332 N.E.2d 886, 371
N.Y.S.2d 715 (1975); People ex rel. Hull v. Graves, 289 N.Y. 173, 45 N.E.2d 161 (1942). See also
infra notes 176-83 and accompanying text.
" See D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-1201 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 232-1 (1976); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:3A-1 (West Supp. 1984-1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 305.405 (1981).
60 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:3A-1 to 2A:3A-29 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
61 Id. § 2A:3A-1.
62 Id. §§ 2A:3A-2, -11, -15.
63 Id. § 2A:3A-12. The judges of the tax court receive the same salary, pension rights, and
other privileges as do judges of the New Jersey Superior Court (the equivalent of the New York
Supreme Court). Id. §§ 2A:3A-18, -19. The Chief Justice of the New Jersey Supreme Court may
assign superior court judges to the tax court, id. § 2A:3A-21, and tax court judges in fact may
be assigned to hear superior court cases from time to time. Id. This authority has not yet been
exercised. Interview with Lawrence L. Lasser, Presiding Judge of the New Jersey Tax Court
(June 16, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Lasser Interview].
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-3 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
6 Id. § 2A:3A-4.
66 During the year ending August 31, 1982, the court received 6,376 cases and disposed of
12,288. PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE TAX COURT OF NEW JERSEY, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE COURT
YEAR ENDING AUGUST 31, 1982, at 2 [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]. Ninety-three per-
cent of these cases were property tax cases. Eighty-eight percent of property tax cases and
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and has jurisdiction to hear and resolve federal and state constitu-
tional questions. 7 The tax court's rules of procedure incorporate the
rules of the New Jersey State Supreme Court wherever possible. De-
viations occur if required by the tax court enabling statute, other tax
statutes, by the special nature of the case at bar, or the desire of the
court to achieve speedy dispositions." Except in small claims mat-
ters, only attorneys may practice before the court.
New Jersey Tax Court judges are not required to write formal
opinions in each case and do so only in cases considered significant or
novel. In certain instances, judges will rule from the bench. In most
other situations, decisions are disposed of in letter opinions. Formal
opinions are reported in a bound volume of New Jersey Tax Court
decisions.
There are two ways in which the presiding judge attempts to assure
substantial uniformity in the decisions rendered. First, the judges
meet monthly to discuss issues and review opinions that have been
prepared for publication. Second, the presiding judge can assign to a
single judge a number of cases involving the same issue. This judge's
decisions can then provide future guidance to other judges faced with
similar issues.6 9 Ultimately, of course, appellate review may be neces-
sary to resolve differences of opinion.
The court maintains six permanent locations and travels to hear
cases in other locations. Each judge's courtroom staff is limited to a
single clerk. Hearings are recorded on sound equipment, obviating
the need for additional courtroom personnel. The court has a small
claims division for cases involving refunds or additional tax assess-
ments of $2,000 or less, exclusive of interest and penalties.70 Small
claims hearings are informal; the judge hears testimony and receives
any evidence that is necessary or desirable for a just determination.
Tax court decisions, including those of the small claims division, may
be appealed to the appellate division of the supreme court.7
eighty-three percent of state tax cases were resolved prior to trial. Id. at 4.
67 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-4 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
" See Lasser, Year One: New Jersey's Tax Court, N.J. LAW., Aug. 1980, at 10, 11.
e' Lasser Interview, supra note 63.
70 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-5 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
71 Id. §§ 2A:3A-4.1, -10.
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C. Independent Review Boards
1. Overview
Independent review boards are quasi-judicial agencies located
within either the executive or legislative branches. Unlike internal re-
view mechanisms, an independent review board is separate from the
tax department.7 2 Generally, independent boards have jurisdiction to
review all rulings related to taxes, including property tax valua-
tions.7 Members of the review board are usually appointed by the
Governor, with Senate confirmation required in about one-half of the
states. The number of board members ranges from two to eleven,
with three to five being typical. Most states have some criteria for
choosing members, such as political party affiliation, expertise in tax
matters, and residency.
7 4
Procedures before review boards vary widely, with approximately
one third of such boards providing both formal and informal hear-
ings, one third only formal hearings, and one third primarily informal
hearings.7 5 Testimony is either tape-recorded or recorded by a
stenographer. Strict rules of evidence rarely apply.7 6 Very few review
boards have separate small claims proceedings.
Judicial review of a review board's decision is always available,"
and may be lodged in an inferior court,7 a or in the state's highest
court. 9 Ordinarily, review is limited in scope; it may be limited to the
record, to questions of law, or to the record and any evidence spe-
cially admitted for good cause. Taxpayers generally begin an appeal
in a review agency by filing a petition and paying a fee ranging from
two to forty dollars. Although they need not be represented by coun-
sel, few taxpayers appear pro se for formal hearings. Taxpayers gen-
erally may be represented by either an attorney or an accountant.
7 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 517 (1954). See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 73.01 (West 1957). For a list of
state statutes providing for the use of independent review boards, see supra note 6.
73 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 519 (1954). See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 73.01(4)-(5) (West 1957 &
Supp. 1984-1985).
71 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 517 (1954). See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 73.01(2) (West 1957 & Supp.
1984-1985).
70 See FEDERATION OF TAX ADM'RS, STATE TAX REVIEW AGENCIES: ORGANIZATION AND PRAC-
TICES, RESEARCH REPORT No. 79, at 18 (1978).
76 84 C.J.S. Taxation §§ 510(f), 537(b) (1954).
77 See, e.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 73.015 (West 1957 & Supp. 1984-1985); see also 84 C.J.S. Taxa-
tion § 547 (1954).
78 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 43.05.240 (1977).
7' See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 541.6 (1974).
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2. The United States Tax Court: A Federal Review Board
The United States Tax Court, another type of independent review
board, provides a principal forum for contested federal tax claims.80
Despite its name, the tax court is not part of the federal judiciary.
Rather, it is a legislative court, subject to congressional appropriation
and oversight.8 ' In many aspects, however, it resembles a federal dis-
trict court.
Tax court judges are appointed for fifteen-year terms and their sal-
aries are identical to those of federal district court judges.82 The rules
of practice and evidence are generally similar to those used for non-
jury trials in the United States District Court of the District of Co-
lumbia.8 3 Streamlined procedures are available for hearing cases in-
volving less than $5,000; such procedures provide for no formal rules
of evidence, no formal opinion, and no right of appeal.8 "
Tax court judges sit primarily in Washington, D.C., although each
travels fifteen to twenty weeks per year. Cases are heard in approxi-
mately one-hundred cities. Judges generally sit in each city for two
weeks at a time. Ordinarily, the judges sit individually and, until re-
cently, their opinions were forwarded to the Chief Judge for review.
Since March 1, 1983, however, Tax Court judges have been author-
ized to issue bench opinions that are not subject to review. 5 Al-
though it is too early to assess the impact of this new power, bench
opinions will probably be used primarily to expedite decisions in
small claims cases.8 6
Uniformity in decisionmaking is ensured through conferences
among the judges. A judge's decision becomes final thirty days after
being rendered, unless the Chief Judge directs that it be reviewed in
conference.8 7 Generally a review is called for only if a conflicting
opinion exists, a case raises a significant issue of law that has not yet
been decided, or a judge seeks to overturn an earlier decision of the
court.
Attorneys can practice before the court without demonstrating any
80 26 U.S.C. § 7442 (1982). Tax disputes can also be litigated in district courts or in the
United States Claims Court. See id. §§ 7402, 7428.
1 Id. §§ 7441, 7442. See also Burns, Stix Friedman & Co. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 392
(1971).
82 26 U.S.C. § 7443 (1982).
I' d. § 7453.
Id. § 7463(a).
85 2 TAX CT. REP. (CCH) Rule 152, at 5089-28 (Jan. 27, 1984).
88 Interview with Charles S. Casazza, Clerk of the United States Tax Court (June 28, 1983).
26 U.S.C. § 7460 (1982).
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proficiency in tax matters. All others, including certified public ac-
countants, must pass an examination before they are allowed to
practice. 88
3. Wisconsin: A State Review Board
The Wisconsin Tax Appeals Commission is an example of a state
independent review board.89 The Commission consists of four part-
time members and one full-time member, appointed for six-year
terms by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Wisconsin
State Senate.90 The Commission handles all state tax matters and
also reviews the property tax assessment of manufacturing equip-
ment. These assessments are made by the Wisconsin State Depart-
ment of Revenue on behalf of local governments."1 A taxpayer first
meets with one of eleven conferees within the Department of Reve-
nue for an informal conference.9" If the conference mechanism fails to
resolve the dispute, the taxpayer may then appeal to the independent
Tax Appeals Commission.93 The commissioners travel to designated
central locations around the state. Generally, one commissioner pre-
sides at a hearing. Commissioners may issue oral opinions, but gener-
ally do so only in small claims cases that do not involve significant
questions of law or fact. The Commission usually issues written opin-
ions that are circulated among, and signed by, all five members. The
members meet approximately once a month to discuss cases and to
help achieve uniformity in their treatment of issues.9 4
Attorneys, accountants, and taxpayers may appear before the Tax
Appeals Commission. The rules of evidence are strict, generally fol-
lowing the Wisconsin Circuit Court rules.95 Taxpayers who subse-
quently seek judicial review take their cases to the Wisconsin Circuit
Court, then to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.96 Final judicial review
rests with the Wisconsin Supreme Court.97
8 See id. § 7452.
8' See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 73.01 (West 1957).
-0 Id. § 1506(1).
"1 Id. § 73.01(5) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
" Interview with Clayton Seth, Director of the Appellate Division, Wisconsin State Depart-
ment of Revenue (Jan. 9, 1985).
"' Interview with Joe Ziesel, Administrative Assistant to the Wisconsin Tax Appeals Com-
mission (Jan. 9, 1985).
9 Id.
" WIS. STAT. ANN. § 73.01(4)(d) (West 1957).




II. CRITICISMS OF THE NEW YORK STATE TAX APPEALS SYSTEM
New York's existing tax appeals system has been sharply criti-
cized.9 8 The complaints have taken several forms, but most question
the fairness and efficiency of the process. Both of these qualities are
obviously desirable in any public agency that determines the legal
rights and liabilities of citizens.
A. Lack of Independence
The Tax Appeals Bureau operates within the Department of Taxa-
tion and Finance as an internal review mechanism. This institutional
linkage provides the basis for what over the years has become a per-
sistent criticism of the New York system - its lack of independence
and consequent bias in favor of the Department. 9 This criticism
arises because tax appeals in New York are decided by an agency
that is organizationally related to one of the parties in the dispute.
Some criticize that relationship on the ground that human beings
tend to favor themselves or their associates, a tendency that under-
lies the ancient common law maxim that no person should be a judge
of his own case. In response to these concerns, governmental institu-
tions typically display a separation of powers, and more specifically,
an independent judiciary. Judicial independence ensures an investi-
gation into relevant facts and law, untainted by the favoritism that is
suspected if an adjudicator has a direct or indirect interest in the
outcome of a case. 100 To the extent that the judges in New York tax
appeals are associated with one party, the Tax Department, it is in-
evitable that perceptions and fears of bias will be asserted by taxpay-
ers or their representatives.
1. Institutional Links Between the Tax Department and the State
Tax Commission
The structure of the New York State Department of Taxation and
Finance described in subsection A of section I should allay some fears
of bias. The Tax Appeals Bureau is organized and operated sepa-
" See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
91 See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The perception of unfairness in the system was
highlighted by the 1975 Governor's Task Force on Court Reform. See generally Governor's
Task Force Report, supra note 2.
100 See supra note 1.
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rately from the rest of the Department. Yet other institutional links
still remain, and thus the risk of bias and perceptions of unfairness
persist.
First, the findings of fact and conclusions of law by the Bureau are
merely recommendations to the New York State Tax Commission.
Final authority in this matter rests with the Commission.1 "' The
President of the Commission is also the Commissioner of Taxation
and Finance. He is directly charged with the administration of the
Department, which is the state's revenue collection agency. Because
the Department is always one of the parties in the contested matters
upon which the Commission rules, the Commissioner is required to
sit in judgment of the very acts for which he and his subordinates are
responsible. Moreover, some perceive that the performance of the
Commissioner of Taxation and Finance may be evaluated by the
amount of revenue, or the increase in revenue, collected under the
Commissioner's tenure. While this criterion is an improper basis
upon which to measure the Commissioner, there nonetheless is a fear
that such an evaluation may exert subtle, perhaps subconscious pres-
sure upon him.
Second, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance is directly in-
volved in the promulgation of regulations."0 2 As President of the
Commission, the Commissioner is asked to apply these regulations
neutrally in cases before him. This confusion of regulatory and adju-
dicative functions increases the risk that the strict application of pre-
existing regulations will be subordinated to other policy considera-
tions. Although these policy considerations are properly the Commis-
sioner's concern when he acts in a regulatory function, they should
have no influence when he acts as a judge. 0 3
Third, quite apart from the double role of the Commissioner-Presi-
dent, risks of bias are inherent in the existing structure. While the
Tax Appeals Bureau is separately organized, it remains a component
of the Department of Taxation and Finance. Common institutional
identity, transfers of personnel between divisions, physical proximity,
and budgetary links provide opportunities for the development of
bias.104 The structural interrelationship between the Bureau and the
101 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 171(21) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
210 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
'1 The two other Commission members also serve multiple roles. They not only sit in judg-
ment of tax cases, but also are responsible for the promulgation of regulations. Additionally,
they "perform such other duties in the department as the commissioner of taxation and finance
may prescribe." N.Y. TAX LAW § 170(5) (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
10' Currently all formal hearing officers, including the supervising tax hearing officer, have
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Department is illustrated by current institutional procedures that at-
tach the Commission's name, and not the Department's, to official
actions that are taken by the Department. These actions include the
issuance of advisory opinions 1°5 and warrants. In addition, hearings
in Albany and Rochester are held at offices located within the De-
partment. In New York City, hearings are held at offices next to
those of the Department. It is hardly surprising that under these cir-
cumstances, any distinction between the Tax Commission and the
Department becomes blurred to taxpayers and their representatives.
A final source of the perceived risk of bias grows out of the Depart-
ment's inability to appeal from an adverse decision of the Commis-
sion,10 6 a limitation that makes some sense in the current structural
scheme in which the roles of "judge" and "prosecutor" are inter-
twined. The Department's inability to appeal, however, reinforces
taxpayers' perceptions that the Commission is an arm of the Depart-
ment, rather than an independent entity. If the Commission were
truly independent, little reason would exist for denying the Depart-
ment a right of appeal. Furthermore, although the Department's in-
ability to appeal adverse decisions would appear to favor taxpayers,
the opposite result is said to occur. Some persons assert that because
the Department has no right to appeal, the Commission has a ten-
dency to rule against taxpayers in close cases. 10 7 This perception,
coupled with the limited review afforded by the courts, 08 creates an-
other area of taxpayer resentment.
Other than undocumented reports, there is no factual evidence of
actual bias in specific instances. 10 9 However, the validity of the argu-
come to the Tax Appeals Bureau from outside the Department, although there is no require-
ment that they do so. This is not true of small claims hearing officers or those individuals in
post-hearing review.
Some federal administrative law judges, see infra note 115, admit that because the agency for
which they work may be determining their promotions and such day-to-day perquisites as
parking spaces and office allocations, a shadow is cast over their independence. See In-Judges
May Be On Their Way Out, Bus. WK., June 11, 1984, at 158 [hereinafter cited as In-House
Judges].
100 Statutorily, the Commission is responsible for issuing advisory opinions; in practice, how-
ever, the Commission rarely plays any role. See supra note 12.
,06 See generally N.Y. TAx LAW §§ 288, 430, 478, 510, 690, 1090, 1138 (McKinney 1975 &
Supp. 1984-1985).
107 This assertion has been made in conversations with the authors by attorneys who practice
before the Commission.
108 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
o Members of the State Bar have asserted that "in some cases the Commission has received
unilateral input from the Law Bureau, without the taxpayer being notified of such input or
being given the opportunity to respond." Comeau & Rosen, supra note 1, at 261, 265. Arthur R.
Rosen has also stated that "several individuals are willing to disclose specific examples [of bias]
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ment regarding the lack of independence of the Tax Commission and
the resulting risk of unfairness ought not to turn on the presence or
absence of such proof. Improper influences cannot be expected to
manifest themselves in easily apparent or visible ways. Nor can the
behavior of past and current commission members, hearing officers,
and Tax Appeals Bureau directors, no matter how impeccable, assure
similar behavior by their successors. Furthermore, when a perception
of unfairness exists among a large body of tax practitioners, that per-
ception becomes identified with reality. The best method, indeed the
only method, available to ensure fair and sound determinations, is to
establish structures and procedures that are most likely to produce
the desired results. Structures and procedures that avoid the appear-
ance of injustice do more than simply that, they also represent the
best means of achieving the reality of justice. 110
2. Tax Appeals in the Context of Administrative Adjudication
Admittedly, the institutional arrangements that characterize the
New York State tax appeals system and the criticism they inspire are
not unusual in administrative agencies."' The New York tax appeals
in an appropriate forum." Letter from Arthur R. Rosen to Robert D. Plattner, Counsel to the
Tax Study Commission (Feb. 7, 1984). One explanation offered for the absence of documented
instances of bias is that taxpayers and their representatives are unwilling to come forward with
specific allegations for fear that such complaints might lead to retaliation at some future time.
As emphasized in the text, however, the issue of whether any improprieties have actually oc-
curred is not germane to the issue of avoiding the appearance of bias.
110 Statistics can be compiled to indicate what percentage of cases tried before the Commis-
sion are favorable, either in whole or in part, to the taxpayer. Such statistics, however, are not
terribly meaningful unless they can be compared with the percentage of cases which should
have been won by the taxpayer. This percentage, of course, is extremely difficult to ascertain.
Furthermore, a high percentage of cases won by taxpayers may merely reflect the Department's
inability to settle cases based on hazards of litigation, see infra notes 152-63 and accompanying
text, or the failure to weed out cases that should not be tried. Similarly, a high percentage of
cases favorable to the Department would not necessarily demonstrate bias.
The New York State Division of the Budget, in an unpublished report on the Tax Appeals
Bureau, found "that over 40% of the cases sampled had partial settlements and the resolutions
in the remaining 59% were split evenly between the taxpayer and the Department." Letter
from R. Wayne Diesel to Assemblyman Daniel B. Walsh, Chairman of the Tax Study Commis-
sion (July 18, 1984). Based on these statistics, the report concluded that the Department did
not prevail in an "inordinate number of cases." Id. For the reasons stated above, the report's
approach and conclusion are problematic. Without first determining how the cases sampled
should have been resolved, the Division of the Budget's statistics do not support its conclu-
sions. Furthermore, because the Budget report is not published, it is impossible to determine
the methodology used for sampling cases.
"' See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 316 (1976); Hector, Problems of the CAB and the
Independent Regulatory Agencies, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 208 (R.
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system follows the approaches of the Federal and the State Adminis-
trative Procedures Acts,1" which require that persons responsible for
initiating, investigating, and prosecuting cases, be separated within
the agency from persons responsible for adjudicating such cases.
Agency heads, however, retain final control of all aspects of their
agencies' work, including administrative adjudication. This frame-
work has been held to be consistent with the federal constitutional
requirement of due process."' 3 Standing alone, however, the preva-
lence of this kind of administrative agency adjudication cannot jus-
tify its retention in the context of New York tax appeals. Indeed,
consideration of the reasons for the usual administrative arrange-
ments and the inapplicability of those reasons to the New York State
tax appeals system lead to exactly the opposite conclusion.
The norm for adjudication in our legal tradition includes an inde-
pendent decisionmaker. 14 The presumption is that no person should
sit in judgment of himself.' Combining functions in administrative
Rabin ed. 1979).
:,2 See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(1984); N.Y.A.P.A. § 307(2) (McKinney 1984).
" See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See also Oatman v. State Tax Comm'n,
50 A.D.2d 1015, 377 N.Y.S.2d 659 (1975), motion for leave to appeal denied, 39 N.Y.2d 709
(1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 1067 (1977).
"4 Ordinarily, adjudication is thought of as a process in which a court decides a concrete
controversy by impartially applying pre-existing and impersonal rules. A court does not assert
its own opinion of the merits, but utilizes more general judgments that have already been made
and which have been embodied in the applicable rules of law. Modern students of jurispru-
dence may find this orthodox view unrealistic but there is little doubt that it describes the deep
seated expectations of most litigants and lawyers concerning the task of courts of law. For
discussions and criticisms of this view of adjudiciation, see, e.g., M. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER 112-47 (1967); K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 27-51 (1969).
There is, of course, an inevitable legislative, and therefore discretionary, aspect to adjudica-
tion under the common law. Common law adjudication, however, is severely constrained by
precedent, and it is usually the exceptional and novel case in which judicial creativity plays a
major role. Common law policymaking by court6 is, in Justice Holmes' phrase, "confined from
molar to molecular motions." Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Such adjudication, therefore, is not inconsistent with the general view that courts
apply established rules and standards.
The wide support for this view probably reflects a conviction that the coercive power of legal
authority ought to be applied only if the individuals who are subject to it can be presumed to
have advance warning. In this way, both liberty and security from arbitrary government action
are promoted. The insistence on government action through a priori, general, and known rules,
lies at the heart of our traditional concept of the "rule of law." See generally L. FULLER, THE
MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
Because this standard view of adjudication considers courts as acting on the basis of objective
rules, notions of the character or worth of the particular litigants or of some judicially defined
idea of the general welfare are improper considerations for a court. An independent and impar-
tial judiciary reduces the likelihood that these factors will intrude into judicial decisionmaking.
It therefore satisfies a critical element of the concept of fair adjudication.
"' See In-House Judges, supra note 104, at 158. One of the federal changes being considered
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agencies clearly conflicts with this standard model of independent
adjudication. Departures from this model have, however, been de-
fended on the ground that the tasks committed to administrative
agencies are significantly different from those expected of courts of
law.116 In contrast to a court, which applies static, predetermined
rules,1 7 an administrative agency is action oriented, created to
achieve certain goals often only broadly defined in statute,1 such as
discouraging unfair and deceptive practices," 9 or insuring "the safe
and sound conduct of [the banking] business. . . and. . .[maintain-
ing] public confidence in such business and protect[ing] the public
interest."'120 This mission requires that the agency constantly make
new policy decisions within the broad boundaries suggested by the
governing legislation. These particular policy decisions are purposely
left to the discretion of the agency which is assumed to be more capa-
ble in this regard than a legislature. In addition, these powers should
be exercised in whatever form is most likely to advance the agency's
general purpose, and, if appropriate, ought to extend to the agency's
adjudication. Consequently, adjudication should be under the control
of the policymakers, that is, the agency heads. 2'
These special needs of administrative agencies, which are thought
to justify a departure from the model of an independent deci-
sionmaker, are sometimes illustrated by analogy to the management
is the creation of a centralized corps of administrative law judges who would not be employed
by the agency involved in the adjudication. According to Business Week, the reason for the
change is the "judges' own worry that parties challenging an agency's action grow suspicious
when they discover that the judge hearing the case is an employee of the agency." Id. An ad-
ministrative law judge at the Agriculture Department, stated: "'I don't think you can have
public confidence until the public is convinced we really are independent and impartial.' " Id.
(quoting Victor W. Palmer).
"' See 1 ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK 44-71 (1942); J. FREED-
MAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 172-76
(1978); R. LORCH, DEMOCRATIC PROCESS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 47-49 (1969); Auerbach, Some
Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 234,
236-37 (R. Rabin ed. 1979); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1678 (1975).
117 See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 116, at 23-25 (1978); J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS
6-46 (1938); see also supra note 114.
18 See Stewart, supra note 116, at 1699.
"1 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985).
110 N.Y. BANKING LAW § 10 (McKinney 1971).
"I' See W. CARY, POLITICS AND THE REGULATORY AGENCIES 125-34 (1967). The classic state-
ment of the need to make policy through adjudication is found in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). See also Cohen & Rabin, Broker Dealer Selling Standards: The Im-
portance of Administrative Adjudication in Their Development, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.




of a business enterprise. Certainly it would be unnatural when de-
signing a business to divide it between two entirely independent de-
partments, one having responsibility for setting business policy and
the other having responsibility for applying that policy in specific in-
stances. This organizational scheme would clearly be an inefficient
way of achieving the goals of the business.122
Nonetheless, it is exactly this "inefficient" structure that has been
chosen for the conduct of most "public business" insofar as it directly
controls individual activity. The desire for effective government is
subordinated to a general distrust of governmental power. The safety
and security of restricting government by rule of law is preferred to
whatever social benefits might be attained by implementing policy on
a case-by-case basis, without warning, in the course of governmental
decisionmaking. 12 3 Notwithstanding the now well-established excep-
tion of administrative agencies, this separation of powers is still the
norm in American government. Each departure from this norm -
such as that inherent in the New York State Tax Commission -
must be shown to be essential to carrying out the duties committed
to the agency.
The arguments in favor of utilizing agency adjudication as a tool
for policy implementation rely on important assumptions about the
type of policy that the agency should make and on the various tools
that are available to it. These arguments are strongest if four condi-
tions are satisfied. First, the area of law being administered must re-
quire frequent policy decisions that cannot be implemented by ordi-
nary legislation. Second, those policy decisions must require case-by-
case formulation so that they cannot be adequately addressed by pro-
spective and general rules. Third, the necessary case-by-case formula-
tion must be undertaken by the same agency to which the other as-
pects of policymaking and implementation have been committed and
policymaking cannot be competently performed by an independent
board or tribunal. Fourth, the need for combining adjudicatory and
supervisory functions must be so acute that it outweighs the risk of
injury that is always inherent in abandoning the ordinary adherence
to the principle of separation of powers. Only if these four conditions
are satisfied can a case be made for vesting the adjudicatory function
in the same persons who are responsible for supervising the other af-
It" James M. Landis put the point this way: "If in private life we were to organize a unit for
the operation of an industry it would scarcely follow Montesquieu's lines." J. LANDIS, supra
note 117, at 10.
1S "The known certaintie of the law is the safetie of all." E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 395 (F. Hargrave & C. Butler) (1st ed. Philadelphia 1853).
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fairs of the administrative agency.
An examination of these factors indicates that the New York State
tax appeals system represents an unjustified deviation from indepen-
dent decisionmaking.12 4 First, the administration of the state's tax
laws is not the kind of government activity that requires constant
and detailed policymaking. The subject matter to be regulated is not
so elusive that general rules made in advance by the Legislature can-
not adequately achieve their principal goals. 2 ' Unlike such general
legislative objectives as discouraging "unfair and deceptive prac-
tices," promoting "fair competition," or serving "the public interest
and convenience," the goals of the tax system have been traditionally
regarded as attainable through precise formulation by legislation. 26
Certainly the actions of the Legislature, which has set forth its tax
policies in a lengthy and detailed statutory code, 127 are consistent
with this view.
Second, even assuming a need exists for the New York State Tax
Commission to make some discretionary policy decisions, vesting it
with adjudicatory power can only be justified if that policy must be
made on a case-by-case basis, instead of through the use of prospec-
tive rules. Perhaps in some areas of regulation, policymaking through
prospective rules may not be effective, such as where the subject mat-
ter being regulated is prone to substantial and frequent changes. In
that case, a fixed policy prescription designed for one set of circum-
stances cannot be relied upon to meet the overall objective in a dif-
ferent situation. In addition to rapidly changing circumstances, some
areas of administrative jurisdiction may be so varied and complex
that policy must be enunciated somewhat differently in each case -
conditions that favor policymaking by adjudication.
12 8
124 The same conclusion was reached in 1942 by a New York State commission examining the
issue of administrative adjudication throughout state government. The Commission was estab-
lished on March 3, 1939. The report of the Commission concluded:
[This] argument is not applicable to the field of taxation. The administrative process in
taxation is clearly separable from the adjudicative process; the former will have ended
before the latter begins. Audit, assessment and related steps result in the controverted
case, in a conclusion which is challenged by the taxpayers. Such controversies involve
typical justiciable issues of fact and law, and lend themselves peculiarly to adjudication
of the ordinary type.
4 R.M. BENJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE TO HONORABLE HERBERT H. LEHMAN 270 (1942).
125 See K. DAVIS, supra note 114, at 20-21, 48.
See Stewart, supra note 116, at 1699; cf. Cohen & Rabin, supra note 121, at 691, 696.
127 See generally N.Y. TAX LAW §§ 1-1616 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1984-1985).
128 See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947); Baker, Policy by Rule or Ad Hoc
Approach-Which Should It Be?, 22 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 658, 661 (1957).
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Although the subject matter of policymaking in the tax field is ex-
tremely varied, the types of factual situations usually present in con-
tested determinations do not demand truly novel policy decisions.
Rather, they typically require applying established policy to new cir-
cumstances. Moreover, as the length and detail of the New York tax
law indicate, the Legislature has responded to the complexity of fact
situations with great particularity. Furthermore, even in circum-
stances for which adjudication might be a particularly appropriate
policymaking vehicle, the rulemaking process might still be workable.
A leading commentator has argued that the flexibility of regulation
by prior rule has been seriously underestimated, stating that "an ad-
judicatory opinion can never say anything that cannot be said as well
or better in a rule." 129
Third, even if substantial policy decisions must be made on a flexi-
ble case-by-case basis, a further need must be demonstrated. Such
flexible policy formation might also be developed through decisions
made by a tribunal that is independent of the agency responsible for
prosecuting the cases. Consequently, the propriety of uniting all
functions in one agency is dependent on the assumption that this
policymaking must be in the hands of those who otherwise make pol-
icy through rulemaking and enforcement decisions. This argument is
difficult to maintain because divided policymaking is far from un-
usual. In most areas of law, rules are promulgated not only by a legis-
lature, but also, in a subordinate and limited way, by the indepen-
dent common law courts. Divided policymaking also exists with
respect to tax policy, insofar as interstitial policy decisions are made
by the United States Tax Court and other federal courts deciding tax
matters.130 To justify retaining the adjudicatory function in the New
York State Tax Commission, it is necessary to prove that policymak-
ing by an independent tribunal would create unacceptable problems
of coordination.' But the examples of federal tax adjudication, as
129 K. DAVIS, supra note 114, at 64. The full quote reads:
A rule can be written in the form of a set of facts and an answer, and the rule can
specifically provide that all the words used in the rule are to be evaluated against the
single set of facts. A rule, can do anything an adjudicatory opinion can do . . .An adju-
dicatory opinion can never say anything that cannot be said as well or better in a rule.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also id. at 65-66. In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947),
which endorsed agency policymaking by adjudication, the Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
function of filling the interstices of the Act should be performed, as much as possible, through
this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the future." Id. at 202.
:30 Cf. Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 498-502 (1943).
" See COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-
MENT AGENCIES 57-59 (1941).
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well as those of other agencies in which cases are decided by indepen-
dent boards, demonstrate that these problems need not result.1"2
A somewhat different defense of uniting judicial with legislative
and executive functions in the area of tax appeals might be based on
the claim that an independent adjudicator could lack the technical
competence to make policy determinations. Although this position
might be plausible with respect to a system that transfers adjudica-
tion from the agency to the common law courts, it is unconvincing if
the independent tribunal contemplated would itself be limited to de-
terminations of tax issues and its members were qualified in that
field.
Finally, the need to retain the adjudicatory function in the primary
agency may be based on the desirability of using the decisionmaking
process in individual cases to inform the agency's other activities."'
The experience of adjudication is deemed valuable in allowing agency
heads to understand the concrete impact of their actions. This argu-
ment is also unpersuasive with regard to tax appeals. Whatever infor-
mation the agency acquires from adjudication could be easily ac-
quired from its participation in the same matters as an advocate and
from the decisions rendered by the independent review agency.
Thus, none of the justifications that might support a departure
from the norm of independent adjudication is especially persuasive in
the particular context of tax appeals in New York. They do not, in
this situation, outweigh the presumptive values already discussed
which underlie the doctrine of separation of powers and which are
threatened by the institutional arrangements now in place.
The lack of independent adjudication is particularly striking be-
cause of the ubiquitous nature of the tax system. Although deviations
from the principle should not be tolerated even if the number of af-
fected individuals is small," 4 the inevitable tangible and intangible
expense associated with the transition to a separate and independent
adjudicative body may not, as a practical matter, be justified unless a
minimum number of controversies occur. The large number and
value of contested tax matters, however, make this area a clear and
compelling target for reform.
"' See Auerbach, Some Thoughts on the Hector Memorandum, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE AD-
MINISTRATIVE PROCESS 239 (R. Rabin ed. 1979).
... See Baker, supra note 128, at 661-62; Cohen & Rabin, supra note 121, at 715-16, 725;
Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through Rule-Making, 59 Nw. UL. REV. 781, 789-90
(1965).
" See supra notes 111-24 and accompanying text.
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The New Jersey and federal tax appeals systems""5 originally re-
sembled New York's internal review mechanism in structure. They
also were the subject of many of the same criticisms now leveled
against the New York system. Both were subsequently reformed after
legislative investigations1"6 to provide for a fully independent review
of contested tax matters. New Jersey created a judicial tax court.
137
In 1924 the United States Board of Tax Appeals was created, which
eventually was transformed into the current legislative United States
Tax Court.'38
A brief review of the federal experience is instructive because of
similarities between the previous federal tax appeal system and New
York's current system. The Tax Simplification Board, created by
statute in 1921 to investigate the administration of the federal reve-
nue laws, criticized the internal review mechanism then used for the
adjudication of tax matters.3 9 It identified as a fundmental weakness
in the system the lack of independence of the decisionmaking body
from the revenue department. As the federal system grew more bur-
densome and intrusive on the citizenry, the question of its indepen-
dence became more significant. In 1975, a parallel between the New
York and federal systems was drawn by a former Commissioner of
Taxation and Finance. Testifying in support of a New York tax
court, he stated that as a result of the state's present rate structure
and the large number of taxpaying citizens, New York had come to
the approximate point which the Federal Government had reached in
1924, when the United States Board of Tax Appeals was created.""
Parallels to other states exist as well. In 1979, the Commission on
California State Government Organization and Economy issued a re-
port on the California state tax appeals system."' The report noted
135 See supra notes 59-97 and accompanying text.
136 See, e.g., REPORT OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, H.R. Doc. No. 103, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1923); Special Comm. on Tax Appeals Procedure of the Senate of New Jersey, Tax Appeals in
New Jersey: A Critique and Program for Legislative Action (June 26, 1977).
,37 See supra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
'" See supra notes 80-88 and accompanying text. The Board of Tax Appeals was created as
an entirely independent agency in the executive branch of the government. In 1942, its name
was changed to Tax Court of the United States and in 1969, the court was moved to the legisla-
tive branch. For a detailed history of the United States Tax Court, see Dubroff, The U.S. Tax
Court: An Historical Analysis, 40 ALB. L. REV. 7 (1975); see also Comeau & Rosen, supra note
1, at 267.
'39 REPORT OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION BOARD, supra note 136, at 4.
110 Statement of Joseph H. Murphy, President of the New York State Bar Association,
before the New York State Legislature's Select Task Force on Judicial Reorganization (Oct. 2,
1975).




that most tax appeals are adjudicated by boards that are directly or
closely connected with the agencies that administer the taxes. It also
stated that the members of most of these boards are not required to
possess expertise in tax matters. The report concluded that these and
other features of the California tax appeals system leave it suscepti-
ble to influences of bias and incompetence. The report recommended
that a new appellate body be created which would be completely in-
dependent of those agencies and officials responsible for collecting
taxes or administering tax laws. 42 To date, however, these recom-




Practicality requires that tax appeals procedures be measured not
only against the principles of fairness, but also against the need for
efficiency. Any realistic framework must meet both these concerns.
Ideally, an efficient tax appeals system would be simple, rapid, inex-
pensive, and effective. Such a system would resolve controversies
within a reasonable period of time, minimize the use of time-consum-
ing and costly formal procedures, and encourage the settlement of
disputes. These attributes need not be inconsistent with fairness. For
example, informal procedures not only may dispose of simple cases
more rapidly, but also may reduce the need for professional represen-
tation, thereby allowing taxpayers to pursue their rights even in cases
in which limited sums of money are at stake. In other instances, how-
ever, fairness and efficiency may conflict. The desire to protect indi-
vidual rights may result in procedures that are more complex and
1'2 Id. Other current tax issues in New York also have parallels elsewhere. The United States
Congress, for example, in creating the Board of Tax Appeals, was concerned about the lack of
published precedents of the prior tax appeals system. See Dubroff, supra note 138, at 50. The
California report, see supra note 141, speaks to issues of expertise and timeliness as well as the
issue of independence. Each of the policy issues faced by New York has been addressed by the
federal government, New Jersey, California, and other jurisdictions that have examined their
tax appeals procedures. See, e.g., Dubroff, supra note 138, at 60-72.
111 Most recently, the West Virginia State Tax Study Commission recommended that a "tri-
bunal independent of the State Tax Department should be established to hear disputes." WEST
VIRGINIA TAX STUDY COMM'N, A TAX STUDY FOR WEST VIRGINIA IN THE 1980's: FINAL REPORT TO
THE WEST VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE 127-28 (1984). The Commission recommended that either a
tax court or a board of tax appeals be established. Id.
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time consuming than efficiency concerns would dictate. Conversely,
efficiency considerations may suggest that some deviations from the
judicial model of adjudication, with its often elaborate rules (jury
rules, strict rules of evidence, etc.), are proper.
The New York State tax appeals system has been criticized in the
past for being inefficient, although some of the delays that are cited
are undoubtedly attributable to taxpayers. A 1974 report recognized
that "extreme time delays existed throughout the conference and
hearings process. for all taxes, and that the worst delays occur in the
income tax area, where cases can remain unresolved for over 10
years. ' 14 4 In 1975, the tax appeals system was revamped, partially in
response to criticisms of inefficiency. 145 In recent years, such criticism
has abated and some would argue that the system has achieved a
reasonable measure of efficiency.
1 46
Two recent studies of the Tax Appeals Bureau suggest, however,
that serious problems of inefficiency persist. A recent report by the
Office of the State Comptroller concluded that extensive delays occur
in the processing of protests through the prehearing mechanism and
that long periods of time elapse before tax matters are resolved.
1 47
Prehearing conferences require more than a year to close and some
small claims and formal hearings take more than five years. 48 The
second study, a review of sales tax cases decided between June 1982
and April 1983, indicated that the average elapsed time between no-
tice of deficiency and hearing was thirty-five months and that the
average elapsed time between hearing and decision was approxi-
mately twenty months"19 - a total of fifty-five months or nearly five
years.
The New York system does meet many of the criteria required for
Administrative Management & Systs. Group, Org. & Management Unit, Div. of the
Budget, Study of Tax Department Conference and Hearing System (June 1974) (emphasis de-
leted). For additional criticism of tax appeals system, see Ginsburg Statement, supra note 1.
11 Prior to 1975, a case was handled by the same bureau of the Department of Taxation and
Finance that originally assessed the tax (i.e., appeals in personal income tax cases were heard
by the Income Tax Bureau). The 1975 changes established the Tax Appeals Bureau, initiated
the prehearing conference, created a small claims procedure, and significantly increased the
number of hearing officers. Sollecito 1982 Interview, supra note 19.
In 1981, for example, the Commission closed 4,242 cases, while receiving 3,696 new mat-
ters. It reduced-its case inventory by 8.4% - from 6,441 to 5,895. Of these cases, 2,917 were
resolved in conference, including 411 defaults, while 1,325 were decided by the Commission.
Sollecito Sept. 1982 Letter, supra note 26.
147 REPORT 84-S-104, supra note 4, at 5. For the Department's responses to the criticisms
contained in the report, see id. at A-3 to A-4.
", Id. at 5-6.




an efficient system and, the Tax Appeals Bureau continues to im-
prove its procedures. The appeals process begins with an informal
conference mechanism that is designed to encourage the early resolu-
tion of most disputes.15 It then provides increasingly formal proce-
dures - hearings and an Article 78 judicial review - to deal with
disputes that cannot be otherwise resolved. 151 Further, cases destined
for hearing are sorted into formal and small claims hearings. Less
formal procedures are appropriately utilized in trying the small
claims matters. Nonetheless, several aspects of the current system
continue to be inefficient and could be corrected, either as part of
other significant structural changes, or in some cases without major
changes in the basic framework.
2. Obstacles to Settlements
Settlements are essential to the efficient operation of a tax appeals
system. A system that does not resolve a substantial majority of its
disputes at an early stage is likely to be inordinately expensive,
agonizingly slow, or both. Not all tax disputes are, from the perspec-
tive of the state, appropriate for full litigation. Certain disputes are
neither essential to the New York State Tax Department's litigation
policy nor capable of clarifying the law in any meaningful way. 52 No
issues of public policy may be involved. Litigation of these cases may,
therefore, be time-consuming and expensive without having any suffi-
ciently redeeming attributes. 153
Settlements do not necessarily reduce the fairness of a system. In
certain respects, settlements may enhance the uniformity with which
taxpayers having legitimate claims are treated."5 4 Expeditious settle-
150 See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.4 (1983). In October, 1982, the Tax Appeals Bureau
revised its petition review procedures to assure that all petitions are either filed with or imme-
diately forwarded to the Bureau. Previously, petitions filed with the Bureau were sent to the
Audit Division where they had to be retrieved and returned to the Bureau. The revised system
allows for a more expeditious petition review and calendaring of conferences. Coburn Letter,
supra note 14. Mr. Coburn describes this change as "eliminat[ing] any review of the Depart-
ment file by the conferee, thus ensuring impartiality." Id. This admission highlights the indi-
rect ways in which partiality can intrude upon the system if the structural framework is flawed.
151 See N.Y. TAX LAW § 171 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20,
§§ 601-605 (1984); see also N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 7800-10005 (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1984-
1985).
I62 See L. WRIGHT, J. HoUTTE, P. KERLAN, H. DEBATIN, J. JOHNSTONE, H. SCHUTTEVAER & E.
BROWN, COMPARATIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION PROCEDURES IN TAXATION 88 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as L. WRIGHT].
"s Id. at 11, 86-90.
See generally id. at 1-101.
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ments may also permit the state to collect revenues in dispufed cases
more quickly.
The Department gains little from trying cases that are inappropri-
ate for litigation other than protecting the revenue at stake in the
individual dispute. In such cases, the value of the state's interest is
no greater than the amount of the assessment, discounted by the
probability of prevailing should the dispute be litigated, less any
costs that would be incurred. Taxpayers should value their interests
similarly. In this light, it is sensible for the system to be satisfied
with results that generally conform with the parties' assessment of
their interests. This valuation must take into account the hazards of
litigation, i.e., the probability of prevailing in court.155 Settlements
achieved in this manner may produce more uniformity among tax-
payers than would the attempt to decide such cases entirely for one
side or the other. The ability to settle cases based on a realistic ap-
praisal of the litigation hazards faced by both the Department and a
taxpayer facilitates agreements at the administrative level, thereby
enhancing greatly the efficiency of the appeals process while preserv-
ing general fairness.
15 6
The New York State Department of Taxation and Finance has in-
terpreted state law as prohibiting the agency from entering into set-
tlements based on hazards of litigation. 5 ' In effect, the Department
"' "Hazards of litigation" does not imply that the Department should settle cases simply to
avoid the costs of litigation. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, cannot compro-
mise an assessment based upon the nuisance value of a case to either party. The Department
could adopt a similar policy or establish a rule that it will not settle any legal issue if there is a
better than perhaps an 80% chance of prevailing in court.
'" See supra note 155 for a discussion of "hazards of litigation."
xB See supra note 20. In reviewing a draft of this Article, the Secretary to the Tax Commis-
sion suggested that the gift and loan provisions of the New York State Constitution may ban
the settlement of disputes based on hazards of litigation. The New York State Constitution
prohibits gifts or loans of state credit or money. N.Y. CONST. art. VII, § 8. Contrary to the
Secretary's assertion, however, the settlement of a tax or other kind of dispute, for less than the
full amount of the claim, would appear to provide sufficient consideration so that a gift would
not be involved. Indeed, precedent exists for the proposition that legislative action resulting in
refunds of a previously paid, disputed tax does not violate the constitution. See People ex rel.
Clark v. Gilchrist, 243 N.Y. 173, 153 N.E. 39 (1926); Yeaton v. Levitt, 19 A.D.2d 935, 244
N.Y.S.2d 334 (1963), afl'd, 14 N.Y.2d 912, 200 N.E.2d 860, 252 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1964). Conse-
quently, it is difficult to maintain that legislative action granting the Department the power to
settle disputed claims based on the hazards of litigation would violate the New York State
Constitution. If the settlement of a dispute were viewed as a gift, the Department should be
asserting gift tax liabilities against private litigants who compromise cases for something less
than their original claims.
As a matter of practice, cases involving factual disputes may sometimes be resolved in a way
that approaches a compromise based on hazards of litigation. In these cases, the Department's
resolution of factual issues will reflect the merits of each side's case. Legal issues, however, are
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asks a taxpayer to pay voluntarily one-hundred percent of an assess-
ment notwithstanding that the taxpayer has a realistic chance of pre-
vailing in litigation. s58 A well-represented taxpayer is not likely to
make such a concession. The administrative process cannot efficiently
dispose of these kinds of disputes if the Department cannot offer a
sensible compromise prior to litigation that is based on an evaluation
of its probability of success.
15
The power to settle cases on the basis of hazards of litigation is
sometimes criticized as being susceptible to undue influence or un-
principled decisionmaking, although similar fears can also be raised
about the conference mechanism. The experience of the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), however, which exercises precisely this power,
indicates that appropriate procedural safeguards can be incorporated
to prevent abuse. First, the IRS generally places authority for ap-
proving settlements within a small group who have no direct contact
with the taxpayer and who review all proposed settlements based
only on the paper record.6 0 Second, approved settlements are subject
to further review in order to gauge the overall quality of the actions
taken.16' This post-review may occur within the IRS Regional or Na-
never the subject of compromise.
158 At present, over 70% of all disputes are resolved at the conference stage. Sollecito 1983
Interview, supra note 18. In addition to those cases involving factual disputes that are truly
compromised, cases may also be resolved because of (1) new factual material presented by the
taxpayer; (2) better communication of the law by the Department to the taxpayer; (3) the dis-
posal of cases in which auditors failed to follow established Departmental policy; or (4) the fear
by the taxpayers that an appeal to the Commission would not receive fair consideration because
of perceived bias. Id. If only legal issues are in controversy, cases may be assigned for a hearing
without a conference. Id. The settlement process could be substantially improved if the Depart-
ment were allowed to consider the hazards of litigation in negotiating settlements if legal issues
in addition to factual issues are disputed.
If the conference mechanism fails to resolve a matter, it is unlikely that it will be resolved
before or during the hearing. Approximately 25% of cases that are not resolved in conference
are disposed of prior to hearing. Id. This figure, however, includes cancellations and withdraw-
als, as well as settlements. Id. This experience differs greatly from that of certain other jurisdic-
tions, where a majority of cases which have not been settled at the conference level (or its
equivalent) are settled before or during the hearing stage (or its equivalent). See, e.g., ANNUAL
REPORT, supra note 66. The Clerk of the United States Tax Court, Charles S. Casazza, stated
that 28,945 cases were closed by the court in the 12 month period ending September 30, 1983.
Nearly 80% of those cases were closed as the result of settlement between the parties. Approxi-
mately 9% were disposed of through trial and opinion. The remainder of cases closed consisted
largely of dismissals. Interview with Charles S. Casazza, Clerk of the United States Tax Court
(Dec. 8, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Casazza Interview]. The inability of the Department to offer
a settlement based on the hazards of litigation no doubt contributes to the different experiences
of the Commission and the United States Tax Court.
15O See L. WRIGHT, supra note 152, at 87-88.
160 See 4 INTERNAL REVENUE MAN. (CCH) §§ 8281 to 8282.2 (1984).
161 Interview with Bart McGowan, Staff Assistant to the IRS Appeals Division, North Atlan-
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tional offices.162 There are no reported occurrences of improprieties
with respect to the IRS's exercise of its power to settle cases based on
hazards of litigation.
Even if the Department had the power to settle cases based on the
hazards of litigation, some taxpayers assert that another obstacle to
settlement would stem from the lack of an independent tax commis-
sion. In the absence of such an independent forum, these taxpayers
argue that the Tax Department is not compelled to examine each dis-
pute with the degree of objectivity and impartiality that is necessary
to reach fair settlements. If, however, the Department were faced
with the prospect of a full hearing before an independent agency, it
would be more likely to make a detached evaluation, weigh its
chances for success in that forum, and offer a settlement based on a
calculation of its relative chance to prevail.1"3
3. The Use of Hearing Officers
The use of hearing officers in New York decreases the opportunity
for reaching a settlement. Once a case is scheduled for hearing, a
strong likelihood exists that it will, in fact, be tried.16 4 The state sys-
tem affords no other fertile opportunity for settlement at the hearing
stage. Hearing officers do not schedule pretrial or settlement confer-
ences, nor do they view as their major role the attempted resolution
of cases prior to hearing. Even if they were interested in achieving
prehearing settlements, hearing officers may lack the stature or lever-
age necessary to persuade the parties to consider compromise. Evi-
dence from other jurisdictions, however, indicates that additional set-
tlement efforts at the hearing stage produce significant results.
1 65
In the New Jersey Tax Court and the United States Tax Court, as
well as in tribunals in other states, individual judges or board mem-
bers actually hear and decide cases.166 In New York, however, hearing
officers take testimony and write recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. These are forwarded to the New York State Tax
tic Region (Aug. 23, 1984).
102 Id.
1'3 See L. WRIGHT, supra note 152, at 70-101.
264 Approximately 75% of cases scheduled for hearing are in fact tried. Sollecito 1983 Inter-
view, supra note 18.
'" Casazza Interview, supra note 159.
206 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7441-7487 (1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:3A-1 to -29 (West Supp. 1984-




Commission which alone has the statutory power to render a deci-
sion.167 Having the final decisionmaker actually hear as well as rule
on cases would seem clearly preferable. First, from both a theoretical
and practical viewpoint, it is better for a decisionmaker to see and
hear live testimony than merely to review a record (or a tape record-
ing) and the recommendations of a third party who did see and hear
the testimony. Second, taxpayer confidence is likely to be increased if
the final decisionmaker hears testimony because litigants would con-
front the decisionmaker directly. Taxpayers are thus more likely to
come away with the sense that they have had their "day in court."
Finally, because judges or commissioners are likely to be highly-
skilled, experienced, and well-paid tax experts, the quality of deci-
sionmaking should be better than in the case of even well-trained
hearing officers.
The hearing officer format does, however, facilitate uniformity in
the decisionmaking process. Because the New York State Tax Com-
mission, as a whole, ultimately rules on every case, it speaks with a
single voice. In other jurisdictions, individual judges may rule differ-
ently on similar fact patterns, leaving it to a higher court to ulti-
mately resolve an issue one way or another. 6 '
The use of hearing officers has also been defended as reducing the
number of highly paid personnel in the system. If individual "judges"
were to hear cases, the number required for an efficient system would
probably exceed the current number of Commission members -
three - and would at least equal the number of existing hearing of-
ficers - five. These "judges" would presumably receive salaries
higher than those of the hearing officers.
Nonetheless, the use of hearing officers has attendant costs. For
every case heard, a hearing officer must write up recommended find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law. This recommended decision is
then reviewed by the formal or small claims supervising hearing of-
ficer, the post-hearing review unit,169 and, in some cases, by the Di-
,' See N.Y. TAX LAW § 171 (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1984-1985); N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, §
601.8 (1981); id. § 601.9 (1976).
,"" Lasser Interview, supra note 63.
,9 The recent Comptroller's report on the Tax Appeals Bureau criticizes the role of the post-
hearing review in this multi-layered process:
The reviewer is required to examine the entire Bureau file, including the hearing tran-
script or tapes, applicable briefs and evidence submitted by the taxpayer and the De-
partment, and the recommended decisions of the hearing officers. The decisions are re-
viewed for format, to determine whether conclusions are supported by findings, and to
determine consistency with past decisions, applicable laws, and court rulings. The re-
viewer also proofreads the decision to ensure dates, dollar amounts, assessment numbers,
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rector of the Tax Appeals Bureau.170 The Director may write a dis-
sent to accompany the hearing officer's recommendation to the
Commission. These are then reviewed by the Secretary to the Com-
mission and next by the Commission members themselves, who may
also need to consult the record. The hearing officer's opinion may
then be sent back for redrafting.1
7
1
Under other formats, a single judge can hear and rule on a case.
17
1
A formal written opinion may or may not be required in all instances.
The presiding judge can require the court (board) to sit en banc for
cases of unusual importance. Additionally, the judge can establish a
system to review all opinions or just those that deal with novel or
complex cases. Both the New Jersey and the United States Tax
Courts use tools of this kind to achieve uniformity and to categorize
and sort cases according to their significance. In New Jersey, for ex-
ample, decisions in only a small percentage of cases are accompanied
by full written opinions; in other cases, letter opinions are deemed
sufficient.'
Some have questioned how many judges (board members) would
be required to handle the Commission's current caseload efficiently if
they were to hear each case individually. Currently, the Tax Appeals
Bureau has five attorneys who conduct formal hearings, three small
claims hearing officers, and seven individuals who conduct post-hear-
tax years, and decision references are cited properly and to correct for grammatical er-
rors. When the reviewer disagrees with a hearing officer's decision, he prepares a memo
citing the differences for supervisory review. The review of small claims hearing requires
about a day while formal hearing cases require three to four days. Additionally, all cases
are reviewed by the unit supervisors and may also be reviewed by the Bureau's
managers.
The Post Hearing review duplicates the work of the hearing officers as well as that of
the supervisors of the Small Claims and Formal Hearing Units and the Bureau's manag-
ers. Although there may be a need for a review function, such reviews could be done on a
test basis, focusing on items such as specific issues or certain hearing officers. With a
supervisory review already in place, complete reviews of all cases does not seem be [sic]
warranted. The existing post-hearing review staff could then be used in assisting the
hearing units prepare decisions, or conduct hearings, especially since these units have
significant backlogs.
Department officials disagree that this function duplicates the responsibilities of
others. Management considers the Post Hearing Review function vital to assure that de-
cisions are informative, correct and consistent and that it offers an objective review by
someone independent of the hearing process.
REPORT 84-S-104, supra note 4, at 13-14.
170 Sollecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
' See supra note 44.
171 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:3A-2 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
173 Lasser Interview, supra note 63.
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ing reviews.174 There is no apparent reason why an independent
board consisting of five members, which hears cases individually and
uses other staff to hear and decide small claims cases, could not han-
dle the Commission's current caseload. Five board members should
be able to dispose of as many cases annually as the current five hear-
ing officers, while simultaneously avoiding the various layers of re-
view that retard the efficiency of the existing system.
Furthermore, as discussed above, the use of judges rather than
hearing officers may significantly improve the probability of settle-
ment at the hearing stage. In New Jersey, over eighty percent of state
tax cases are settled prior to hearing but after filing with the court." 5
The New Jersey Tax Court judges take an active role in the settle-
ment of cases. Their stature and leverage no doubt facilitate the ne-
gotiations. Overall, a system that relies on individual judges to hear
cases could well enhance both the efficiency and fairness of the tax
appeals process.
C. Unclear Standards of Judicial Review
The actual standard of review employed by the New York Appel-
late Division in scrutinizing decisions of the State Tax Commission is
a matter of some confusion. Article 78 of the CPLR authorizes rever-
sal of an agency decision if "affected by an error of law. 17' 6 Thus,
apart from the ordinary and reasonable deference a court should give
to the interpretation of a statute or rule by the administering agency,
all questions of law are open to review with no presumption in favor
of the Commission's decision.
1 77
With regard to questions of fact, New York courts purport to apply
an "arbitrary and capricious" standard17 8 which seems to be at odds
with the statutory scheme. The requirement that an agency decision
be arbitrary and capricious before it may be judicially reversed is
based on CPLR section 7803(3). 79 Conventional usage in administra-
tive law employs the term "arbitrary and capricious" as a standard
for the propriety of a decision that is committed to an agency's dis-
"I Sollecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
115 See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 66.
116 N.Y. CiV. PRAC. LAW § 7803 (McKinney 1981).
17 See 5 N.Y. JUR. 2D Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 15 (1980); B. SCHWARTZ, supra
note 111, at 596.
118 See, e.g., Grace v. New York State Tax Comrm'n, 37 N.Y.2d 193, 198, 332 N.E.2d 886, 890,
371 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720 (1975).
1'9 N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 7803(3) (McKinney 1981).
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cretion.'8 0 In such a case, an arbitrary and capricious exercise of dis-
cretion is itself illegal and cause for reversal.181 Determinations that
apply the law to facts developed on an administrative record, such as
those involving tax issues, are usually reviewed under a substantial
evidence test, such as that embodied in CPLR section 7803(4).1"2 Sec-
tion 7803(4) requires reversal unless a determination made as a result
of a hearing is, on the entire record, supported by substantial evi-
dence. Because all of the determinations of the Commission are deci-
sions on a record, they are presumably covered by section 7803(4).
Therefore, a decision that is not "arbitrary and capricious," but is
unsupported by substantial evidence on the whole record, is still sub-
ject to reversal. Judicial decisions reviewing determinations of the
Commission have failed to maintain this distinction. Although the
courts purport to use an arbitrary and capricious standard, the actual
standard applied is vague, but deferential.18
The "substantial evidence" test should be the standard of review,
particularly if the decision being heard is that of an independent tax
tribunal. A court should accord considerable deference to the factual
findings of such a body. In addition to the advantages an administra-
tive tribunal has in its first-hand observation of the presentation of
evidence, the decisionmakers have the added benefit of their experi-
ence and expertise in considering questions of taxation. Moreover, in
the area of taxation, the courts have no special competency to justify
a more liberal standard of review than that ordinarily used to review
administrative agencies.
180 One treatise states:
The arbitrary and capricious test is apparently regarded as more restrictive [with re-
spect to the reviewing power of the court] than the substantial evidence rule; that is,
something less than substantial evidence can support a determination as not being arbi-
trary or capricious. The difference in approach seems to be that the arbitrary or capri-
cious rule is applied where there is no right to a hearing. It is said that the substantial
evidence rule and the arbitrary or capricious rule are but two different expressions of the
judicial power and duty to check administrative abuses, the former applicable where evi-
dence is required and the latter applicable where there is no requirement of evidence.
Thus, where there is neither a statutory nor a constitutional right to a hearing, the deter-
mination is a matter of judgment or discretion confined by the legislature to the admin-
istrative agency and the aim of judicial review is to determine whether its action was
arbitrary or capricious.
5 N.Y. JuR. 2D Article 78 and Related Proceedings § 31, at 393-94 (1980) (citations omitted).
See also B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 605-06.
181 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 605-06.
182 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 7803(4) (McKinney 1981).
l8S See cases cited supra note 58.
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D. Absence of Accessible Precedents
A final problem with the current system is its failure to provide
taxpayers with a coherent and conveniently accessible body of deci-
sions and opinions. A body of well-indexed cases would help provide
predictability, uniformity, and fairness in the decisionmaking process
and assure taxpayers of a principled and unbiased hearing.1 84 It may
also improve the efficiency of the system over time by serving to re-
duce the number of cases filed.
The question of how decisions are disseminated involves considera-
tions of fairness and notice. All New York State Tax Commission de-
cisions are now published and distributed by the Taxpayer Services
Division of the Department of Taxation and Finance to persons re-
questing them. The state has been unable, however, to obtain full
publication of opinions by private publishing companies. If private
companies are unwilling to publish Commission opinions in full, the
state might consider publishing its own decisions that it could sell at
cost. In order to have an adequate dissemination system, however, all
Commission decisions should be distributed without charge to public
libraries. At very least, every written decision should be published in
full within a predetermined time limit; the only delay should be the
actual time required to transmit an opinion to the printer and the
time necessary to print and mail it. The Department should have no
role in this process in order to avoid any temptation to delay the
publication of decisions with which it disagrees.
III. OPTIONS FOR CHANGE
Section II of this Article identified and analyzed a number of
weaknesses in New York's current system for resolving tax disputes.
This section sets forth seven policy options that respond to these
problems. These options are not intended to be exhaustive. Clearly,
the existing structure could be modified in countless ways. The op-
tions presented, however, generally focus on basic thematic issues
and serve to identify various stages along a continuum of possible
changes. The options are presented according to the magnitude of
the structural changes that would be required in existing procedures,
and range from preserving the status quo to creating a judicial tax
court.
184 See L. WRIGHT, supra note 152, at 131-38.
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A. Option One - Preserve the Status Quo
The first option would be to preserve the status quo. There is little,
if any, evidence of actual bias in the current system.1i 5 Although iso-
lated incidents have been cited by the tax bar and others that pur-
port to show actual bias in the decisionmaking process,1 86 no one has
been willing or able to identify any pattern of ongoing or systematic
bias. Moreover, in recent years, the efficiency of the system has
improved.
This option, however, would be unresponsive to taxpayers' fears of
bias that are attributable to the absence of an independent forum. In
effect, Option One would require that the present system remain un-
changed because no hard evidence exists that it produces unfair re-
sults despite the risks inherent in its structure.18 7 This alternative,
however, would fail to address the increased efficiency that would
likely result from granting the Department of Taxation and Finance
the clear authority to settle cases based on hazards of litigation.
B. Option Two - Minor Statutory Changes
Even if the state decides not to alter the structure of the appeals
process, certain statutory and operating changes could be made to
eliminate some characteristics of the current system which needlessly
underscore taxpayers' perceptions of bias. This process should begin
with changes in the tax law to allocate appropriately responsibilities
between the New York State Tax Commission and the Department
of Taxation and Finance. The current statutory framework formally
makes the Commission both the tax assessor and collector - roles it
no longer plays in any meaningful way.188 The Commission should
surrender all vestiges of these responsibilities and the statute should
be amended accordingly. The Commission would issue regulations
and decide contested tax matters - and nothing else. The Commis-
sion's name would be removed from advisory opinions and
warrants. 9
Another improvement in this direction would be to hold hearings
at offices not associated with the Department. In addition, the Com-
mission, rather than the Department's Division of Taxpayer Services,
1 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
', See supra note 109.
167 See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
188 Coburn Letter, supra note 14.
389 See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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should publish and disseminate all decisions. Although these changes
would not address more fundamental problems, they would at least
mitigate some of the confusion over the roles of the Commission
which reinforces taxpayers' fears of unfairness in the appeals process.
C. Option Three - Settlement Authority Based on Hazards of
Litigation
Even if all other features of the existing system remain unchanged,
the state should grant the Department the clear authority to settle
cases based on the hazards of litigation.190 Procedural safeguards sim-
ilar to those used by the IRS would be required to prevent an abuse
of discretion.' 9' This modification is not incompatible with any of the
other options outlined in this section of the Article and should there-
fore be considered regardless of what other changes might be made in
the existing structure or procedures.
D. Option Four - Remove the Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance from the Tax Commission
The least disruptive structural change in the existing system would
be to remove the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance from the
Commission and to replace him with a third person. This proposal
has a number of advantages. First, it would remove some of the ac-
tual and perceived risks of bias in the present process by separating
the administrative and adjudicative roles now united in the Commis-
sion.192 Second, the changes required would be relatively few and
easy to implement. The increased cost would be small: the amount of
the additional salary for a new Commission member. Third, it may
well be that the skills required to administer a large revenue collec-
tion agency are very different from those needed to rule on contested
tax matters. There is no particular reason why an excellent Commis-
sioner of Taxation and Finance should necessarily make an excellent
"judge," or vice versa, and it may be unfair to impose both sets of
responsibilities on the same person. Fourth, this proposal would re-
move a significant and time-consuming burden from the Commis-
sioner of Taxation and Finance, who must review transcripts and de-
cide contested cases in addition to his other considerable
190 See supra notes 152-63 and accompanying text.
I'l See supra notes 160-62 and accompanying text.
0o2 See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
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administrative duties. Administering the Department is obviously a
full-time commitment as is the adjudication of tax disputes. In an
earlier age of lower taxes, simpler tax laws, and consequently less liti-
gation, the Commissioner of Taxation and Finance might have been
expected both to administer the Department and to rule on cases.
Today, however, these duties impose a heavy burden on one person,
no matter how hardworking or talented he may be. Perhaps because
of this concern, the Commission uses a procedure under which the
other two members review all cases before they are sent to the Com-
missioner of Taxation and Finance. If these two agree, and they take
pains to do SO,' 9 3 the Commissioner does not have to spend time
thoroughly reviewing the case. The temptation, therefore, is to accede
to the decision reached by the other two Commission members. The
result could be that a taxpayer's case will receive full consideration
only by two members of the Commission. If one of these persons is a
tax expert but the other is not, a taxpayer's case may receive a com-
plete and thorough review by only one Commission member.
The greatest drawback of Option Four is that it would fail to sepa-
rate completely the Commission from the rest of the Department and
would continue to mix rulemaking and adjudicatory functions.' e4 The
Commission, for example, might be asked to judge the validity of reg-
ulations that it had promulgated. Additionally, the Tax Commission
and the Department of Taxation and Finance would remain as two
components of a single organization. Many of the subtle opportuni-
ties for the development of bias would continue. A taxpayer pursuing
a claim through the administrative process might still perceive that
the same entity is both a party in the dispute as well as the judge
that will hear and rule upon the contested matter.
E. Option Five - Remove the Regulatory Functions from the
Commission
A variation of Option Four would be both to replace the Commis-
sioner of Taxation and Finance with a third party and to remove the
Commission from the regulatory process. By taking away the
rulemaking role from the Commission, this option would respond
:93 Interview with Mark Friedlander, New York State Tax Commissioner (Oct. 27, 1983).
" Commissioner Mark Friedlander has suggested that the benefits of this overlap might
outweigh the drawbacks. The Commissioners, who would not be responsible for the collection
of revenue, would review potential regulations from a "neutral" or even "pro-taxpayer" per-
spective. The Commission could thus ensure additional outside input into the regulatory pro-
cess and perhaps temper any occasional "overzealousness" of the Department. Id.
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better than Option Four to concerns regarding violations of the doc-
trine of separation of powers. Under this proposal, tax regulations
would be the sole responsibility of the Commissioner of Taxation and
Finance, with a continuation of the present opportunities within the
Department for public input into the process.
One version of this alternative might require the Commission to
have its own budget, separate from that of the Department of Taxa-
tion and Finance. An independent budget would remove another pos-
sible source of control or leverage over the Commission and would
achieve a further separation of the adjudicatory body from the rest of
the Department. A more complete separation would be accomplished
if the Commission was housed in a separate physical structure from
the Department, a change that would entail additional expense.
These aspects of Option Five constitute an almost complete sepa-
ration of the Commission from the Department. Nonetheless, a weak-
ness in Option Five is that taxpayers might still perceive the re-
vamped Commission as merely a continuation of the past, without
fully appreciating the extent of change. Once at this stage along the
continuum of possible changes, it may be more sensible to take the
next step and restructure the entire adjudicatory process rather than
to make only patchwork changes. Additionally, a restructuring of the
process, discussed in Options Six and Seven, could involve other sig-
nificant improvements, such as the replacement of hearing officers by
"judges."
F. Option Six - An Independent Tribunal
At the core of this option is the creation of an independent tribu-
nal located not in the judiciary, but in the legislative or executive
branch, similar to the United States Tax Court or the Wisconsin
State Tax Appeals Commission. 95 As a natural consequence of this
proposal, the State Tax Commission would be abolished. The De-
partment of Taxation and Finance would continue to be headed by a
Commissioner, appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the Gov-
ernor. The Department, through the Commissioner, would continue
to be responsible for the promulgation of regulations.
Beyond this basic structural framework, a host of other issues re-
main unresolved. Independent review boards can differ from one an-
other in a variety of ways, including the formality of the proceedings,
'" See I.R.C. §§ 7441-42 (1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.01-.11 (West 1957 & Supp. 1984-
1985). See also supra notes 72-97 and accompanying text.
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the qualifications of those who hear cases, and the standard for ap-
pellate review.196 Some of these issues are discussed below. The crea-
tion of an independent tribunal does not necessarily require some or
all of the additional changes discussed, but does provide an opportu-
nity to address or reconsider these issues.
1. Tribunal Membership, Appointment, Tenure, Etc.
The independent tribunal might consist of five to seven individu-
als, appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The exact number would obviously depend on the tribunal's
expected workload. Each member of the tribunal should be an attor-
ney who has practiced law for some minimum period of time,19 7 and
who possesses special expertise in tax matters. An advisory group
representing lawyers and accountants might be established to certify
a candidate's expertise or, at the least, to have the opportunity to
provide some comment and evaluation.
198
Appointments would be for a term of years. To increase the pres-
tige and status of the tribunal so that qualified and dedicated tax
experts will be attracted as members, the salaries and other benefits
should be equivalent to those received by judges of the New York
State Supreme Court.199
2. Tribunal Procedures
The tribunal would have a presiding member, designated by the
Governor, who would bear primary responsibility for its administra-
tion. The tribunal would hear all cases de novo, with full opportunity
for the examination and cross-examination of witnesses. Ordinarily,
the members of the tribunal would hear cases individually and would
not rely on hearing officers. The presiding judge, however, could
196 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7441-7442 (1982); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.01-11 (West 1957 & Supp.
1984-1985).
9 7 Judges of the New York State Court of Appeals and justices of the New York State Su-
preme Court must have been admitted to practice law in New York for at least 10 years before
assuming office. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 20.
198 An official commission on judicial nomination evaluates qualifications of candidates for
appointment to the court of appeals and prepares a written report to the Governor. See id. §
2(c).
199 For a description of the salaries and other benefits received by judges of the New York
State Supreme Court, see N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 221-b, 221-bb, 222 (McKinney 1983).
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schedule cases of particular importance to be heard en banc. Addi-
tionally, the presiding judge could require a case that was heard by
one of the judges to be reviewed on the record by the tribunal as a
whole. Tribunal members should conduct prehearing and settlement
conferences to maximize the resolution of cases prior to hearing.
Tribunal members should not be required to render formal written
opinions in all cases. Instead, formal opinions might be issued only in
cases of some importance. In other cases, letter opinions would suf-
fice.200 The presiding tribunal member could have the power to re-
view formal opinions and the members might meet relatively often to
discuss issues of mutual concern. Tribunal members would maintain
both permanent locations and ride circuit as well, using available
court room space.
The presiding member would have the authority to appoint mem-
bers of the bar with experience in tax matters to hear and rule on
small claims cases. The taxpayer would have the right to choose the
small claims forum if the dispute were within established jurisdic-
tional limits. The rules and proceedings for small claims should be
simple and designed to expedite cases; otherwise, a taxpayer would
have no incentive to choose this forum. The choice of the small
claims forum would constitute a waiver of the right to judicial appeal,
but there could be an appeal to the tribunal in egregious cases.2",
The rules of practice and evidence would be adopted by the tribu-
nal itself. The rules should provide the safeguards embodied in the
State's Administrative Procedure Act,20 2 but they need not be as
complex as the CPLR.203 The rules should be designed to encourage
the simple, inexpensive, and rapid disposition of cases, while preserv-
ing fundamental requirements of fairness. Accountants, as well as
lawyers should be allowed to represent clients before the tribunal.2 4
200 New Jersey uses a similar approach. Lasser Interview, supra note 63. Care must be exer-
cised, however, to ensure that letter opinions are properly limited only to insignificant cases
having no precedential value.
20 For example, an appeal could be granted upon a showing that "a serious miscarriage of
justice" had taken place before the tribunal would hear the case de novo. Bias on the part of
the hearing officer, or some fundamental denial of due process would constitute such a
miscarriage.
202 N.Y.A.P.A. §§ 301-307 (McKinney 1984).
203 The New York State Civil Practice Law and Rules occupy 15 volumes of McKinney's
Laws of New York Annotated and have been the bane of law school graduates studying for the
New York bar examination.
204 Lawyers, accountants, and persons admitted to practice before the IRS or the United
States Tax Court, can represent clients under the current appeals process. Other individuals




The factors that a taxpayer now considers in deciding whether to ap-
peal pro se, or to retain an attorney or an accountant, would not be
very different when litigating in an independent tribunal.
3. Continuing an Administrative Forum Within the Tax
Department
It is essential that a forum for settlement continues to exist within
the Department of Taxation and Finance itself. The current confer-
ence format is well designed to accomplish this goal.20 5 The confer-
ence proceeding is a valuable tool for efficient management of the
Department and a simple and inexpensive forum for taxpayers to air
grievances, resolve certain factual issues, and reach settlements. Ag-
grieved taxpayers would first pursue their claims at conference. If a
resolution could not be reached, the taxpayer would then file a peti-
tion with the independent tribunal.
One argument raised against an independent tribunal is that it
would be less efficient than the current system.2 0 Because the De-
partment would no longer be responsible for managing the hearing
process, it would have no stake, as it does now, in seeing that a large
percentage of cases were resolved in conference.20 The Department,
with no interest in settlement, might force too many taxpayers to
pursue their claims to the independent tribunal, overloading the sys-
tem. This argument, however, improperly characterizes the Depart-
ment's interest in resolving disputes prior to hearing. Faced with the
prospect of defending its position before an independent tribunal,
along with the corresponding staffing required for such a defense, the
Department should have a real interest in disposing of cases at the
conference level. The experiences of the federal government and
other jurisdictions with independent tribunals indicate that revenue
departments do resolve a majority of cases through their internal, in-
formal conference mechanisms. Nonetheless, if the Department does
not, for whatever reason, facilitate the resolution of cases at the con-
ference level, the independent tribunal will face an increased work-
load that could hamper its efficiency and perhaps necessitate further
changes to encourage more settlements. The Department, for exam-
205 See N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 20, § 601.4 (1982); see also supra notes 18-26 and accompany-
ing text.
206 This argument has been offered in various interviews. Coburn Letter, supra note 14; Sol-
lecito 1983 Interview, supra note 18.
207 Coburn Letter, supra note 14.
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pie, could be made liable for a certain percentage of a successful tax-
payer's costs of litigation.
4. Right to Appeal
At present, the Department of Taxation has no right to appeal an
adverse decision.20 8 This makes some sense under the current system
in which the judge (the Commission) and the prosecutor (the Depart-
ment) are components of a single agency. If a new independent tribu-
nal were created, no compelling reason would exist to deny the De-
partment the right to appeal decisions of the tribunal to the courts.
The inability to appeal an adverse decision is cited by the Depart-
ment as a benefit of the current system which would be lost to tax-
payers. Some tax lawyers and accountants feel, however, that the
Commission rules against taxpayers in close cases for the very reason
that the Department has no right to appeal.20 9 The relatively narrow
scope of judicial review of Commission decisions might also en-
courage this practice because a case is unlikely to be overturned on
appeal. Whatever the reality, characterizing the issue in this manner
obfuscates a more fundamental point. The right to appeal from a sys-
tem that is structurally designed to increase the likelihood of fair and
unbiased results, whether actual or perceived, is preferable to specu-
lating about who gains from the ramifications of the present
system.21 0
5. Publication of Tax Appeals Decisions
The written decisions and opinions of the tax tribunal should be
regularly published in full, in an easily accessible form, and suitably
indexed. A tax tribunal that issues formal opinions in only selected,
noteworthy cases might influence a private publisher to publish New
York tax cases. If not, the state should do so and sell the publication
at cost and distribute it to libraries.
208 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
2 0 Under this option, the standard of appellate review, which perhaps needs statutory clarifi-
cation, would be the current "substantial evidence" rule. For a full discussion of standards of




Option Six would completely satisfy the requirements for a fully
independent and impartial decisionmaking body. Moreover, the use
of individual judges to hear cases would be an improvement over the
current structure. Some of the additional features outlined could also
enhance the overall quality and fairness of the system.
Whether Option Six would improve the efficiency of the current
system is difficult to assess. It seems clear that the existing system
cannot be defended on efficiency grounds. Certainly, the grant to the
Department of Taxation and Finance of full settlement authority,
along with the complete publication of a coherent and accessible
body of precedent, should promote the goal of efficiency.211 Specula-
tion about other issues of efficiency should not be allowed to divert
attention from the more fundamental issues of fairness, which Option
Six clearly addresses.
G. Option Seven - A Judicial Tax Court
The most far-reaching reform would be the establishment of a New
York Tax Court, which would be located in the judicial branch of the
government,212 and would be entirely separate from the Tax Depart-
ment. This option would achieve in the most unambiguous and reso-
lute fashion an independent and impartial forum for hearing tax dis-
putes. Unlike an independent tax tribunal that would be located in
either the legislative or executive branch, a judicial tax court would
not be viewed as being sensitive to revenue raising considerations.
1 3
A tax court would be likely to bring other advantages, although
many of these could be achieved under Option Six as well. The posi-
tion of a judge, with the prestige that it implies, would be almost
certain to attract highly talented and experienced individuals, pro-
moting the quality of the entire process. A tax court would probably
operate so that judges would actually hear testimony rather than rely
on hearing officers. Additionally, a tax court would be more likely to
develop a body of published precedents, which would encourage fair-
"' See L. WRIGHT, supra note 152, at 86-90, 131-38; see also supra text accompanying notes
164-75.
212 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI.
213 Most tax practitioners, however, do not view the United States Tax Court, which is a




ness and efficiency.214 Finally, because the court would be within the
judicial system, its operations would be subject to the scrutiny of the
New York State Office of Court Administration. An office would
therefore exist which would be specifically charged with the task of
reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of the court's operations.
This option, however, poses some significant problems. Foremost is
that the creation of a tax court would entail a revision of the judici-
ary article of the New York State Constitution.215 The adoption of a
constitutional amendment would be a cumbersome and lengthy pro-
cess.21 Moreover, a proposal for a full judicial court would also raise
concerns regarding the wisdom of adding one more specialized court
to the New York court system. Advocates of broad court reform gen-
erally view these specialized courts with disfavor. 1 7 Further, there is
opposition in some quarters to the use of full judicial courts to re-
solve disputes if less formal, less expensive, and less time-consuming
forums are suitable alternatives.21 Even those who might concede
that taxation would be an appropriate area for the creation of a spe-
cialized court, may nonetheless oppose Option Seven because of the
precedent it would set.
Further problems exist concerning client representation. The pres-
sure to adopt the rather complex CPLR, or rules modeled on the
CPLR, would be substantial if a new tribunal were part of the state's
unified court system. Consequently, client representation by account-
ants, now common, might well be prohibited in a tax court.21 e The
New Jersey Tax Court, for example, allows accountants to represent
clients only in its small claims division, where relatively small sums
are involved.220
Because of these drawbacks, Option Seven probably is less desira-
ble than Option Six. The experience of the United States Tax Court
seems to indicate that a court that is not part of the judiciary can
nonetheless achieve both the perception and reality of a fully inde-
pendent forum. In light of this experience, the disadvantages in pur-
214 See L. WRIGHT, supra note 152, at 131-38.
215 N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
,1' For the procedures involved in amending the New York State constitution, see N.Y.
CONST. art. XIX.
W See, e.g., Transcript of the Minutes of a Hearing of the Select Task Force on Court Reor-
ganization 15-28 (Nov. 20, 1975).
216 Id.
21 At present, only attorneys can practice before the courts established under N.Y. CONST.
art. VI. Allowing accountants to practice before an Article VI Tax Court might be resisted
because it would represent a major exception to a long-standing rule.
120 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:3A-5 to -8 (West Supp. 1984-1985).
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suing a judicial court might outweigh the possible benefits that such
a court could offer over an independent, non-judicial tribunal of the
kind outlined in Option Six. The changes discussed under Option Six
would be just as effective in correcting the fundamental weaknesses
in the current system, providing for decisionmakers who actually
hear live testimony, and allowing for a rapid, inexpensive hearing
process. Furthermore, it would avoid the problems22 ' that would be
likely to surround the creation of a judicial tax court.
H. Costs of Implementation
The additional costs, if any, imposed by each of the various options
above are difficult to quantify accurately. A precise estimate cannot
be made until the details of a particular option are formulated with
specificity, especially regarding Options Six and Seven. Some gener-
alizations, however, are possible.
Implementation of Options Two and Three would involve trivial
costs.22 Option Four would involve the cost of an additional commis-
sioner's salary, currently $51,200.22 3 Option Five would probably not
impose any costs over those imposed by Option Four.224 Options Six
and Seven would result in additional costs.226 Expenses for services
such as mailroom, personnel processing, secretarial support, library
and housing - now incurred by the Department of Taxation and Fi-
nance - would be borne by a new independent tribunal. Because of
economies of scale, the Department's savings under Options Six and
Seven in not performing these functions would likely be less than the
costs incurred by the new tribunal.
It should be noted, however, that the New York State Tax Com-
mission's appropriation for the 1984-1985 fiscal year is $2.56 mil-
lion. 2 6 While not all of these funds can be attributed solely to the
Commission's adjudication function, certainly some of the existing
appropriation could be re-allocated to an independent tribunal and
would not represent "new money." Moreover, a new, independent
I'l A proposal for a judicial tax court would be likely to become entangled in the debate
concerning other knotty, highly publicized issues involving the judiciary, which are now before
the New York State Legislature, thus creating additional obstacles to its full consideration.
2 See supra text accompanying notes 188-91.
223 NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF STATE, MANUAL FOR THE USE OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF NEw YORK 627 (1982-1983). See supra text accompanying notes 192-94.
22 See supra pp. 393-94.
, See supra text accompanying notes 195-221.




body would almost certainly charge a filing fee.227 The revenues from
these fees would help offset the tribunal's costs. Furthermore, if a
new independent tribunal settled cases faster, and was generally
more efficient, state revenues would be enhanced. Finally, increased
revenue might result if the Department were given the right to ap-
peal. These potential sources of revenue, however, would be offset to
some extent if taxpayers were encouraged to litigate issues that they
now concede. Additional costs might also result if the Department,
because it would no longer be responsible for managing the entire
hearing process, had less incentive to settle cases and thereby forced
more taxpayers to pursue their claims than at present.
CONCLUSION
The current system of tax appeals fails to satisfy certain funda-
mental principles concerning the independence of decisionmakers.
This failure to comply fully with the precept of "separation of pow-
ers" fuels taxpayer perceptions of possible unfairness and creates in-
herent risks of actual bias in the adjudication of tax disputes.
This Article has not attempted to document specific instances of
actual bias. The validity of the argument regarding the lack of inde-
pendence of the New York State Tax Commission and the resulting
risk of unfairness ought not to turn on the presence of proof of bias.
The best method to ensure fair determinations is to establish proce-
dures that are most likely to produce the desired results. Such proce-
dures not only improve perceptions of fairness; but also are the best
means of achieving actual fairness.
Other administrative agencies are marked by the same institutional
arrangement that has been criticized in the context of tax appeals.
Nonetheless, the arguments offered in favor of the involvement of the
Department of Taxation and Finance in the adjudicatory process are
unconvincing.
The efficiency of competing tax adjudication systems is difficult to
assess. The current New York State tax appeals system can be criti-
cized on efficiency grounds, but other systems will not necessarily
prove more efficient. The central issue, however, is one of fairness
and taxpayers' perceptions of fairness. Attention should not be inap-
propriately diverted from that issue.
"' Based on information compiled in 1982, the filing fees charged by independent tax tribu-
nals in other states range from approximately $2 to $40. See Legislative Tax Study Comm'n,
supra note 166.
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